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The Emerging Legal Problem of Naturally Occurring 
Asbestos and Washington State’s Swift Creek 
Conundrum 
Jean O. Melious† 
Naturally occurring asbestos (NOA) is no different than asbestos 
found in buildings and products. Although human exposure to any 
asbestos is harmful, human exposure to NOA is particularly prob-
lematic because it occurs in varied locations, in varied forms, and 
in varied quantities. Unlike the laws applicable to asbestos in the 
occupational setting, the laws applicable to NOA are vague and of-
ten unhelpful. As a result, health professionals, regulators, and 
lawyers find it difficult to advise communities about risk and liabil-
ity issues. This article examines these issues in the context of NOA 
in northwest Washington State. Specifically, a large landslide on 
Sumas Mountain in rural Whatcom County deposits more than 
100,000 cubic yards of soil containing NOA and heavy metals into 
Swift Creek every year. Unfortunately, Swift Creek is part of an in-
ternational river system that delivers NOA across farmlands, 
through small towns, and into Canada. This is a particularly intrac-
table problem because asbestos-laden soil will continue to slide into 
Swift Creek for at least the next 400 years. As the river system con-
tinues to deposit NOA onto riverbanks, across farmland, and into 
yards and basement, possible health risks to humans will need to be 
addressed. Because the scale of this asbestos dilemma is particular-
ly daunting, both in terms of the timeframe and of the affected geo-
graphical area, it highlights many of the difficulties of addressing 
NOA and its effects on communities. This article evaluates applica-
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ble laws and discusses the difficulties of piecing together a solution 
to a problem that the legal system does not recognize. As agencies 
and residents continue to grapple with the enormous Swift Creek 
asbestos problem, hopefully those experiences will contribute to the 
development of a more rational policy to address the difficult legal 
and health issues raised by NOA. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
[W]here we are right now is a seam between the authorities. And that’s 
not an answer you want to hear, but to the extent I understand it, it’s 
probably the reality. 
—Mike McCormick, Seattle District Commander, U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers.1 
                                                
1. Transcript of Swift Creek Meeting at Glen Echo Community Club 35 (Nov. 20, 2007)  
[hereinafter Nov. 2007 Transcript], available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/CLEANUP.NSF/sites/sumasmtndocs/$FILE/Swift+Creek+Meeting+Tra
nscript_Nov2007.pdf. 
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If there is a problem now, there must be a way to address it. 
—Clifford Villa, Assistant Regional Counsel, U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Region 10.2 
 All asbestos occurs naturally, which makes the term “naturally 
occurring asbestos” (NOA) somewhat misleading. Nonetheless, the 
“natural” label is widely applied to asbestos minerals found in their 
natural state—in bedrock or soils.3 Because NOA is “natural,” it is 
difficult for many people to believe that exposure to asbestos in the 
environment could be harmful, despite the fact that asbestos used in 
manufactured products is known to harm health.4 
 The potential for human exposure to NOA is widespread 
throughout the United States.5 According to the U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS), asbestos-containing minerals have been documented in twenty-
seven of fifty states,6 including a number of areas where development is 
occurring rapidly. As a result, increased construction and land 
development will generate dust that contains NOA, leading to potential 
environmental health hazards from airborne asbestos.7 
 Asbestos has been regulated extensively in occupational settings 
because of the acute health hazards it creates in that context. Asbestos in 
the environment, however, exposes the many gaps in scientific 
knowledge about asbestos and its toxicity and adds some 
                                                
2. Minutes of the Whatcom Cnty. Council Special Surface Water Work Session 9 (July 18, 
2006), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/council/2006/minutes/water_resources/ 
sw0718.pdf. 
3. Bradley S. Van Gosen, U.S. Geological Survey, Reported Historic Asbestos Prospects, and 
Natural Asbestos Occurrences in the Rocky Mountain States of the United States (Colorado, Idaho, 
Montana, New Mexico, and Wyoming) (2007), http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2007/1182/pdf/Plate.pdf. 
4. Jill J. Dyken & John S. Wheeler, ATSDR’s Experience with Community Exposure to ‘Natu-
rally Occurring Asbestos’, 70 J. ENVTL. HEALTH 74 (2008). 
5. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
Naturally Occurring Asbestos Locations in the Contiguous USA and Alaska and the 100 Fastest 
Growing U.S. Counties (July 20, 2007), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/noa/docs/usamap.pdf. 
6. Jeff Slivka, Naturally Occurring Conditions Could Create Liability For Contractors, Insur-
ers, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CAS. INS. (July 27, 2009), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/
2009/07/27/naturally-occurring-conditions-could-create-liability-for-contractors-insurers; see also 
Naturally Occurring Asbestos, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/NOA/where_is_asbestos_found.html (con-
taining links to maps showing known deposits of NOA). In Washington State, “Swift Creek might 
be the most well known landslide to contain asbestos but since asbestos occurs throughout Washing-
ton State, many other landslides have the potential to contain asbestos.” Landslides Potentially Con-
taining Asbestos, SLIDING THOUGHT BLOG (July 9, 2009), http://slidingthought.wordpress.com/200
9/07/09/landslides-potentially-containing-asbestos/; see also Deep-Seated Landslides in Formations 
that Contain Asbestos, SLIDING THOUGHT BLOG, http://slidingthought.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/
asbestos-landslides2.jpg. 
7. R.J. Lee et al., Naturally Occurring Asbestos—A Recurring Public Policy Challenge, 153 J. 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 1, 2 (2007). 
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epidemiological and ecological wrinkles of its own. The Agency for 
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a federal public health 
agency that addresses exposure to hazardous substances in the 
environment, summarized the problem of quantifying NOA exposure in 
communities as follows: 
 Our knowledge of asbestos exposure and disease response 
comes almost entirely from studies of asbestos workers who 
experienced relatively high exposure to commercial-grade asbestos 
materials regularly over quantifiable periods of time, usually for 
many years. In contrast, NOA exposures occur to individuals of 
diverse ages and backgrounds and typically occur at lower levels 
and in an irregular or intermittent fashion.8 
 Health professionals and regulators find it difficult to advise 
communities about the risks posed by NOA, leaving residents uncertain 
about what risks they may face and what responses are appropriate. 
Lawyers similarly may find it difficult to provide clients or communities 
with clear advice about options and liabilities in this emerging legal 
field, which incorporates some aspects of asbestos law (even when it is 
not helpful in the environmental context) and excludes other aspects of 
the law (even when they would be helpful in the environmental context). 
Clients with asbestos-laden soils and communities that need to plan for 
growth in areas with asbestos face uncertain liabilities based on risks that 
are difficult to quantify. 
 This article examines these issues in the context of the 
environmental and potential health problems created by NOA from the 
crumbling serpentine face of Sumas Mountain in northwest Washington 
State. Because the scale of this asbestos dilemma is particularly 
daunting, both in terms of the timeframe and of the affected geographical 
area, it highlights many of the difficulties of addressing NOA and its 
effects on communities. 
 A large landslide on Sumas Mountain, believed to be the result of 
natural forces, deposits more than 100,000 cubic yards of soil containing 
chrysotile asbestos fibers and heavy metals into Swift Creek every year.9 
Asbestos-laden soils will slide into Swift Creek for at least the next 400–
                                                
8. Dyken & Wheeler, supra note 4. 
9. PACIFIC SURVEYING AND ENGINEERING, INC., WHATCOM COUNTY DEP’T OF PUB. WORKS, 
SWIFT CREEK SEDIMENT MANAGEMENT PLAN PROPOSED DESIGN 1 (March 30, 2011) [hereinafter 
SEDIMENT MANAGEMENT PLAN], available at http://www.whatcomcounty.us/pds/plan/sepa/pdf/swi
ft-creek-sediment-mgmt-plan-final-20110330.pdf. 
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600 years;10 in the words of an engineering report, the landslide 
“represents a functionally unlimited sediment supply.”11 
 To complicate matters, Swift Creek is part of an international river 
system that delivers asbestos from the landslide to Canada. Swift Creek 
starts at the toe of the landslide and flows west for about four miles to its 
confluence with the Sumas River. The Sumas River, in turn, meanders 
roughly fifteen miles through agricultural land and past the small towns 
of Nooksack and Sumas before reaching the Canadian border. Once in 
Canada, the river flows through the city of Abbotsford, British 
Columbia, before merging with the Fraser River ten miles north of the 
border.12 As discussed below, the Canadian government and Canadian 
scientists have been actively involved in Swift Creek research. To date, 
however, Canada has not publicly advocated for a solution to the 
problem, despite evidence that American asbestos has affected Canadian 
rivers and farms. 
 When Swift Creek and the Sumas River flood, a fairly regular 
occurrence, receding floodwaters coat farmland with asbestos-laden soils 
and heavy metals. This can prevent crop growth. Until recently, 
sampling along Swift Creek had indicated that asbestos levels in 
sediments ranged from around one percent to as high as four percent. In 
May 2009, however, samples along areas of the Sumas River that 
flooded during the previous winter showed much higher concentrations. 
Almost all samples contained at least ten percent asbestos, and the 
percentage of asbestos in some samples reached twenty-seven percent. 
By comparison, the federal workplace standard for asbestos exposure is 
one percent, and federal health and environmental agencies state that 
there is no safe level of exposure to asbestos. 
 The existence of such high levels of asbestos along the Sumas River 
has caused concern among federal, state, and local agencies. Many of the 
people who live along Swift Creek and the Sumas River, in contrast, 
view the health risk as a figment of the environmental and health 
officials’ imaginations. The nature of the risk that asbestos creates causes 
this crucial disconnect between the agencies and the people that they 
serve. People understand harm, especially harm to health, when they can 
see it and when there is a clear cause-and-effect relationship. What harm 
does NOA cause? In ten, twenty, or thirty years, some residents may 
                                                
10. KERR WOOD LEIDAL ASSOCS., SWIFT CREEK BACKGROUND AND MANAGEMENT 
ALTERNATIVES: REPORT TO WHATCOM COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL ZONE DISTRICT 1-1 (2008). 
11. Id. at i. 
12. DIV. OF HEALTH ASSESSMENT AND CONSULTATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., HEALTH CONSULTATION: SWIFT CREEK SEDIMENT ASBESTOS, WHATCOM COUNTY, 
WASHINGTON 4 (2006) [hereinafter HEALTH CONSULTATION], available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.go
v/hac/PHA/SwiftCreekSedimentAsbestos/SwiftCreekHC033006.pdf. 
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suffer from one of the lung diseases associated with asbestos. Perhaps, 
for any given individual, NOA exposure will result in no harm at all. 
 The discovery of asbestos in the soils, however, clearly has harmed 
some property owners in the area. Their property is suddenly worth 
much less, and they can do less with it. Although asbestos-laden 
sediments continue to clog Swift Creek, government agencies no longer 
allow the creek to be dredged. The immediate harms of flooding and of 
the legal uncertainty surrounding NOA appear, to some residents, to be 
far worse than the health risks. 
 As a result, residents often view the agencies charged with 
protecting them as the sources of their problems. As one citizen stated at 
a public meeting: 
I, and I'm speaking for myself but others may have the same 
sentiment, don't believe your fuzzy science. I'm living proof. I've 
been here since the '60s. I've played in it, worked in it, hauled it, ate 
it as a kid, and I have not suffered any ill health. And that's what 
people—see, they don't believe you and they don't like to be told 
what to do. I don't like to be told what to do with gravel on my own 
property. I need some fill. Now I can't even touch it and I'm too 
cheap to buy it, so what I've got here is a problem.13 
 Although some members of the public blame the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) for creating the problem of asbestos, and many 
residents may wish that the agencies would just go away, neither the 
agencies nor the public will be able to close the Pandora’s box of 
potentially dangerous contamination. Health and environmental agencies 
cannot say with certainty that exposure to asbestos at the levels found 
along Swift Creek and the Sumas River is safe, and as long as that is the 
case, the area remains under a cloud. Even if there is no immediate harm, 
the prospect of harm creates a problem. Out of fairness to the residents 
and property owners along Swift Creek and the Sumas River, the 
identification of a problem ought to lead to the timely development of a 
solution. 
 Unfortunately, existing law does not provide a clear solution. As 
discussed below, the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),14 often referred to as the 
Superfund law, could impose liability for exposure to asbestos resulting 
from human activities that artificially disrupt asbestos-laden soils. In 
Whatcom County, this could include creek dredging that has occurred 
                                                
13. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 59. 
14. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
9601–9675 (2010). See infra text accompanying notes 143–84, for a discussion of CERCLA and its 
applicability to NOA. 
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since the 1940s and the subsequent use of dredge spoils for unknown, 
but presumably widespread, purposes. However, Superfund liability 
raises several knotty problems. 
 The primary problem is that there is no dumper, no polluter, and no 
big company making money by externalizing the costs of its 
environmental harm. Although humans have dredged the creek and 
moved the soils, nature is the primary “responsible party.” The only 
potentially liable parties are government agencies and private individuals 
who behaved rationally, even responsibly, in response to a natural threat. 
This raises the second problem with Superfund liability: there are very 
few entirely clean hands. A number of agencies, at various levels, have 
authorized or have been involved in actions that disturbed asbestos-
bearing soils over the years. It would be difficult for any agency to 
attempt to impose liability on any other party without raising questions 
about its own role. Finally, the likely costs of liability are so high that no 
potentially liable party would be able to provide sufficient resources. 
 One hypothetical option would be to attack the problem at its 
source by building structures or channeling water to prevent the release 
of NOA from the landslide on Sumas Mountain. As discussed below, 
however, engineering solutions are expensive and may not even provide 
a permanent solution to the problem. 
 The United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) may have a 
role to play. The Corps has suggested that its ecosystem restoration 
authority could help address the Swift Creek watershed. Two immediate 
practical problems plague this authority: first, the Corps’ cost-benefit 
requirements do not favor spending large sums of public money in 
sparsely populated areas; and second, a local partnership requirement 
would impose costs on cash-strapped local or state agencies. 
 A state-of-the-art proposal for a solution to Swift Creek might 
include land use planning to avoid increased exposure to asbestos-laden 
soils, the construction of a sediment trap to reduce short-term threats, 
and acquisition of the properties that are most significantly affected. 
Reflecting the unusual circumstances of the problem—the property is 
almost all in private ownership, and some riverbank homes are in small 
towns—the property within the hazard area could be subject to a long-
term buyout program. The cost of such a program, while high, would be 
much lower than any other alternative. 
 There is no legal obligation for any agency to create or fund a 
buyout program, however, and no obvious funding source. Absent 
evidence of immediate harm, there is no constituent pressure; in fact, 
many constituents likely would oppose such a program. Under these 
circumstances, dedicating public funds to the purchase of property in a 
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sparsely populated area in response to a problem that is largely outside 
the focus of major media is unlikely. 
 Basic fairness calls for such a solution, however, because the status 
quo is not likely to be kind to property owners affected by NOA. Real 
estate laws require owners to disclose asbestos in or on property,15 and 
buyers are likely unwilling to accept the risk of asbestos except at a 
discount. A buyout program could ensure that landowners were offered 
reasonable compensation, constituting both a prudent long-term fiscal 
policy for the public sector and the assurance of fair treatment of 
innocent landowners. 
II. ASBESTOS RISKS AND INFORMATION GAPS 
Looking around the room, I've been here longer than anybody here. I've 
walked on this dirt and I've drank water out of the wells and I think I'm 
the healthiest individual in the room. 
—Vernon Leibrant, Resident, Whatcom County, Washing-
ton.16 
A. How Dangerous Is Naturally Occurring Asbestos? 
 The risk from NOA is difficult to quantify, difficult to 
communicate, and difficult for citizens to understand. Exemplifying this 
difficulty is a government publication on NOA, titled Limiting 
Environmental Exposure to Asbestos in Areas with Naturally Occurring 
Asbestos.17 The fact sheet asks, “How could asbestos exposure make you 
sick?” and responds, “Important! Being exposed to asbestos does not 
mean you will develop health problems.”18 These apparently conflicting 
messages—that asbestos may make you sick, but then again, it may 
not—reflect the scientific uncertainty about asbestos and its effects, as 
well as the difficulty of predicting exposure to NOA. 
1. Definition and Detection of Asbestos Fibers 
 Among the many factors that play into the uncertainties 
surrounding the health effects of NOA is the fact that the term “asbestos” 
does not clearly delineate the minerals of concern. Asbestos can be 
defined as follows: 
                                                
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.06.013 (2010). 
16. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 37. 
17. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., LIMITING ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS IN AREAS WITH NATURALLY 
OCCURRING ASBESTOS, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/noa/docs/Asbestos%20LimitExp_ENG_web.pdf. 
18. Id. at 2. 
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[C]ertain minerals that have crystallized in a finely fibrous habit, in 
bundles of easily separable fibers and/or fibers which are composed 
of smaller diameter fibrils, and with a hair-like elongated shape 
resembling organic fibers, with exceptionally smooth faces and 
displaying unusual adamantine or silky luster.19 
 The term “asbestos” was defined by industry to refer to minerals 
that were commercially exploited.20 Asbestos fibers historically have 
been classified into two main mineralogical groups: serpentine and 
amphibole. Chrysotile, by far the predominate form of asbestos present 
at Swift Creek, is the only type of serpentine fiber and accounted for 
ninety-five percent of commercial asbestos applications.21 
 Chrysotile asbestos has relatively long and flexible fibers, 
compared to the shorter, more brittle fibers of the amphibole variety.22 
Asbestos is narrowly defined by regulatory agencies, including EPA and 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as fibers 
that are at least five micrometers (!m) in length with an aspect ratio 
greater than or equal to 3:1.23 This regulatory definition of asbestos 
appears to be based not on epidemiological or clinical health data, but on 
the physical detection limits of the technology that was used to identify 
asbestos at the time that the regulations were developed.24 The majority 
                                                
19. Martin Harper, 10th Anniversary Critical Review: Naturally Occurring Asbestos, 10 J. 
ENVTL. MONITORING 1394, 1394 (2008). 
20. Id. 
21. ROBERT VIRTA, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ASBESTOS: GEOLOGY, MINERALOGY, MINING 
AND USES (2002), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2002/of02-149/of02-149.pdf. There are five 
types of amphibole minerals, including actinolite, anthophyllite, grunerite (amosite is the asbesti-
form version), riebeckite (crocidolite is the asbestiform version), and tremolite. Harper, supra note 
19, at 1394. Actinolite fibers have been found in some Swift Creek-related soil samples. JULIE 
WROBLE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING FOR ASBESTOS: 
SUMAS MOUNTAIN ASBESTOS SITE SELECTED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region10/pdf/sites/sumasmountain/asbestos_monitoring_report_april2011.pdf. 
Other minerals, including talc and various lesser-known minerals that were not commercially ex-
ploited, may also have an asbestiform habit. Harper, supra note 19, at 1394–95. “Asbestiform” 
describes the shape assumed by crystals of minerals when they form as thin-hair-like fibers. Lee, 
supra note 7. 
22. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR ASBESTOS 2 (2001) [hereinafter TOXICOLOGICAL 
PROFILE], available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp61.pdf. 
23. HEALTH CONSULTATION, supra note 12, at 6. 
24. “The limit of [one] percent asbestos by weight for ACM is a somewhat arbitrary level and 
was chosen because of technological constraints (i.e., polarized light microscopy (PLM) could not 
detect asbestos levels below this level).” ANTHONY PERRY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A 
DISCUSSION OF ASBESTOS DETECTION TECHNIQUES FOR AIR AND SOIL: REPORT PREPARED FOR 
OFFICE OF SUPERFUND REMEDIATION AND TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION (2004). The scientific bases 
of NOA regulations thus appear to be rather tenuous, and based largely on industrial standards that 
were formulated using outdated PLM technology. The instrument capability derives from Phase 
Contrast Microscopes (PCM), which are most commonly used to analyze asbestos samples originat-
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of asbestos fibers identified at Swift Creek are shorter than five 
micrometers in length.25 While such fibers do not meet the regulatory 
definition of asbestos, it has not been established that they do not have 
health impacts.26 Because health and environmental agencies regulate 
asbestos based on outdated technological constraints, and because the of 
the limited knowledge of the effect of the shorter fibers prevalent at 
Swift Creek, existing regulatory standards do not adequately address the 
real risk of asbestos at the site. 
2. Health Risks from Asbestos 
 Asbestos fibers are dangerous when inhaled because the fibers 
lodge in the lungs. They can remain there for a lifetime, damaging the 
lungs or lung lining. Although asbestos is associated with asbestosis 
(pneumoconiosis), a scarring of the lungs caused by exposure to 
relatively large asbestos concentrations in the workplace, lung cancer 
and mesothelioma are the major health concerns related to asbestos in 
the environment.27 Mesothelioma is a cancer of the tissue that lines the 
lungs, stomach, heart, and other organs.28 ATSDR, the federal agency 
that compiles such data, describes mesothelioma as a “relatively rare” 
cancer primarily associated with exposure to asbestos. Lung cancer, in 
contrast, is the leading cause of cancer-related death, accounting for 
about twenty-nine percent of all cancer deaths. Cigarette smoking is by 
far the most important risk factor for lung cancer, and cigarette smoking 
                                                                                                         
ing from industrial activity. Id. Transmission electron microscopy is more efficient. It can identify 
fibers at 30,000 times magnification, where an optical microscope can only identify fibers at 400 
times magnification. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, EPA’S ACTIONS CONCERNING 
ASBESTOS-CONTAMINATED VERMICULITE IN LIBBY, MONTANA 2001-S-7 20 (2001), available at 
http://www.nycosh.org/workplace_hazards/epa-oig-montana.pdf. Electron microscopy is capable of 
resolving asbestos fibers smaller than five micrometers in length, but is considerably more expen-
sive than PCM. ECOLOGY & ENV’T, INC., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY REPORT OF EPA 
ACTIVITIES, SWIFT CREEK ASBESTOS SITE, WHATCOM COUNTY, WASHINGTON 3-1 
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT], available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/CLEA
NUP.NSF/sites/sumasmtndocs/$FILE/Final+Report.pdf. When electron microscopes are used to 
analyze asbestos samples, fibers are counted in Polarized Light Microscope Equivalents (PCME), 
and only those fibers meeting the strict regulatory definition are included in the final count. Id. 
25. 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 6-3. 
26. ATSDR has observed: 
[A]nalyses of autopsied human lung tissue of asbestos-exposed and non-exposed patients 
often show greater numbers of short (< 5 !m) than long (> 5 !m) retained fibers, and 
short chrysotile fibers have been reported to be the most prevalent type of fibers found in 
parietal pleura tissue from asbestos-exposed autopsy cases. 
TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 22, at F-23 (citations omitted). 
27. Harper, supra note 19, at 1394. 
28. Mesothelioma, NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/mesot
helioma.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2011). 
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combined with asbestos exposure greatly increases the likelihood of lung 
cancer.29 
 Diseases from asbestos exposure take a long time to develop. Signs 
or symptoms of asbestos-related disease usually do not appear for ten to 
twenty years,30 and mesothelioma has a thirty- to fifty-year latency 
period.31 When symptoms do appear, however, they may resemble the 
symptoms of other diseases. There is no effective treatment for 
asbestosis, which may lead to respiratory failure and death over twelve to 
twenty-four years. Mesothelioma is usually associated with an extremely 
poor prognosis.32 
 According to ATSDR, all types of asbestos cause cancer, but the 
amphibole type is considered the most toxic.33 There is no conclusive 
epidemiological data that supports this statement, however, and EPA 
does not differentiate between fiber types when assessing risk of asbestos 
exposure.34 The International Agency for Research on Cancer has 
concluded that all commercial asbestos fibers cause lung cancer and 
mesothelioma, and has found sufficient evidence that asbestos also 
causes laryngeal and ovarian cancers.35 Likewise, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has concluded that all forms of asbestos, including 
chrysotile, cause cancer. WHO notes that no threshold has been 
identified for the carcinogenic risk of chrysotile and recommends 
avoiding work likely to disturb asbestos fibers.36 Australia, New 
Zealand, and all countries in the European Union have banned 
chrysotile.37 
 Uncertainties regarding asbestos risk, intertwined with politics, 
have precluded asbestos bans in the United States and Canada. Asbestos 
is an overtly political issue in Canada, where a large mine in Quebec 
produces chrysotile asbestos for export, and the federal government 
subsidizes the Chrysotile Institute, a Quebec-based advocacy group 
                                                
29. Asbestos: Health Effects, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY (April 1, 
2008), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/asbestos/asbestos/health_effects/. 
30. Id. 
31. Mesothelioma, supra note 28. 
32. Mesothelioma-Malignant, NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlin
eplus/ency/article/000115.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2011). 
33. TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 22, at 1. 
34. Interview by Douglas Naftz with Julie Wroble, Toxicologist, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 
(Mar. 2, 2009). 
35. T.L. Ogeden, Canadian Chrysotile Report Released—At Last, ANNALS OCCUPATIONAL 
HYGIENE 1, 3 (2009). 
36. WORLD HEALTH ORG., ELIMINATION OF ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASES 2 (Sept. 2006), 
available at http://www.who.int/occupational_health/publications/asbestosrelateddiseases.pdf. 
37. Mia Rabson, Stop Paying to Promote Asbestos Use, Martin Urges, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, 
Nov. 6, 2011, http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/stop-paying-to-promote-asbestos-use-
martin-urges-88532167.html. 
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established in 1984 to promote the use of chrysotile.38 In 2007, Health 
Canada, the Canadian federal health department, convened an “expert 
panel” of scientists with varied views on the health risks of chrysotile 
exposure.39 The panel’s report, which contained cautious statements 
suggesting that several sources indicate that chrysotile probably causes 
lung cancer, was withheld from publication for over a year. This 
prompted the panel’s British chair to observe, “[t]he unexplained long 
delay in publishing the Canadian report illustrates that chrysotile risk is 
still a political issue, but the table and other aspects of the report 
illustrate the wide measure of agreement that now exists on the 
science.”40 Canada has since led the effort to block the designation of 
asbestos as a hazardous substance under the Rotterdam Convention, an 
international treaty that imposes disclosure and trade requirements on 
listed substances.41 
 In the United States, EPA attempted to phase out and ban the 
manufacture, import, processing, and distribution of asbestos products in 
1989,42 but the Fifth Circuit overruled the attempted ban two years later 
in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA.43 The court recognized that “[a]n 
EPA-appointed panel reviewed over one hundred studies of asbestos and 
. . . concluded that asbestos is a potential carcinogen at all levels of 
exposure, regardless of the type of asbestos or the size of the fiber.”44 
The court held, however, that EPA “presented insufficient evidence” to 
justify the ban,45 reasoning that EPA had not sufficiently balanced 
asbestos’ toxic effects on health and the environment against the benefits 
of asbestos, the availability of substitutes, and the economic 
consequences of the rule.46 Characterizing EPA’s proposed ban as the 
                                                
38. Id. 
39. HEALTH CANADA, CHRYSOTILE ASBESTOS CONSENSUS STATEMENT AND SUMMARY: 
CHRYSOTILE ASBESTOS EXPERT PANEL (Mar. 2008). 
40. Ogeden, supra note 35. 
41. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, opened for signature Sept. 10, 1998, 2244 U.N.T.S 
337; see Steve Rennie, Harper Parties in Mining Town as Canada Keeps Asbestos off Hazardous 
List, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jun. 24, 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-
parties-in-mining-town-as-canada-keeps-asbestos-off-hazardous-list/article2074399/. 
42. Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibi-
tions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,468 (July 12, 1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763). 
43. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1214–15 (5th Cir. 
1991). Note that in their amicus briefs, Canada and Quebec opposed EPA’s proposed ban; however, 
the court held that Canadian entities, including a Canadian mining company, did not have standing. 
Id. at 1208–09. 
44. Id. at 1207. 
45. Id. at 1214–15. 
46. Id. at 1216; see also id. at 1223 (“EPA, in its zeal to ban any and all asbestos products, ba-
sically ignored the cost side of the TSCA equation.”). 
2012] The Emerging Legal Problem of Naturally Occurring Asbestos 137 
“death penalty alternative”47 (referring to the “death” of asbestos under 
the ban), the court held that EPA had not sufficiently established that less 
burdensome alternatives would be insufficient. The first Bush 
Administration did not appeal the court’s ruling, and manufacturers still 
use asbestos in consumer products in the United States, including brake 
pads and clutch linings.48 
 Although the last U.S. asbestos mine closed in 2002, the United 
States imported 2530 metric tons of asbestos in 2005, along with 90,000 
metric tons of products that contain it.49 Washington Senator Patty 
Murray introduced a bill to ban asbestos in 2002. The bill, Ban Asbestos 
in America Act, S. 742, 110th Cong. (2007), passed the Senate in 2007, 
but has not become law.50 
3. Exposure to and Epidemiology of Naturally Occurring Asbestos 
 NOA is found in a number of areas in the United States and around 
the world. The USGS and ATSDR have documented NOA in more than 
half of the states, including much of the West Coast.51 
 Several of the areas investigated by ATSDR and EPA involve 
mining, which entails more intense occupational exposure than the Swift 
Creek asbestos situation. The infamous vermiculite mine in Libby, 
Montana, was so heavily contaminated with taconite asbestos that it 
caused asbestos-related disease affecting at least 1200 Libby residents.52 
Additionally, mines in Minnesota, New Jersey, and Alaska have also 
created health concerns.53 A taconite mine at Silver Bay, Minnesota, 
released predominately short asbestos fibers in the air. Although these 
                                                
47. Id. at 1215. 
48. Mesothelioma and Asbestos Risk for Auto Mechanics, SURVIVING MESOTHELIOMA: A 
PATIENT’S GUIDE (March 19, 2010), http://www.survivingmesothelioma.com/news/view.asp?ID=00
111. 
49. David Whitney, Senate is Close to a Deal on a Bill to Ban the Use of Asbestos, KNIGHT-
RIDDER WASH. BUREAU (June 12, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 10969779. 
50. Senator Patty Murray, Ban Asbestos in America, http://murray.senate.gov/public/index.cfm
/banasbestosinamerica (last visited Nov. 22, 2011). Senator Murray has observed: “As I’ve pushed 
my bill in Congress, one of the biggest hurdles has been the senators’ and representatives’ assump-
tion that asbestos was banned long ago.” Jennifer L. Leonardi, It’s Still Here! The Continuing Battle 
over Asbestos in America, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 130 (2005). Concerns over the scope and ex-
pense of asbestos lawsuits, as well as the economic and political strength of the asbestos lobby, have 
also contributed to the continued use of asbestos in the United States. Id. at 146. 
51. See, e.g., Van Gosen, supra note 3; Bradley S. Van Gosen, U.S. Geological Survey, Re-
ported Historic Asbestos Mines, Historic Asbestos Prospects, and Other Natural Asbestos Occur-
rences in Oregon and Washington (2010), http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1041/downloads/Plate.pdf. 
52. Bianca Forde, Revisiting Asbestos-Contaminant Exposure, Regulation, and Reckoning: 
When Death is in the Air, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 289, 290 (2008). See generally ANDREW 
SCHNEIDER & DAVID MCCUMBER, AN AIR THAT KILLS: HOW THE ASBESTOS POISONING OF LIBBY, 
MONTANA UNCOVERED A NATIONAL SCANDAL (2008). 
53. Harper, supra note 19, at 1401–03. 
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fibers, like many of the fibers detected at Swift Creek, were shorter than 
the five-micrometer standard in some asbestos regulations, some experts 
contend that these shorter fibers create a health risk that is as yet 
unrecognized by the antiquated asbestos regulatory scheme.54 In Ambler, 
Alaska, the asbestos-containing tailings of a mine were used to create 
unpaved gravel roads,55 similar to the use of dredged materials for 
numerous purposes in the Swift Creek area. 
 Most of the regulatory activity concerning NOA has focused on the 
El Dorado Hills area of California, about twenty miles east of 
Sacramento.56 Asbestos there is sequestered in subsurface mineral 
deposits, where it can be released when disturbed by soil excavation, 
driving on dirt roads, or detonation of explosives to clear land. 
 NOA was first identified in El Dorado County in the 1980s along 
serpentine-rich dirt roads, which EPA subsequently paved to limit 
exposure.57 In 1998 and 1999, officials discovered that asbestos 
concentrations in air samples taken near the Golden Sierra High School 
in El Dorado County exceeded state air quality limits for asbestos, 
posing a health risk.58 These findings prompted the California Air 
Resources Board to increase sampling in the area, and culminated with 
activity-based sampling by EPA in October 2004.59 The State of 
California and County of El Dorado responded by enacting regulations to 
reduce and mitigate activities likely to create airborne dust. 
 Outside the United States, studies and reports of inhabitants 
exposed to NOA indicate the possibility of health risks. Studies in South 
Africa and Western Australia, where commercial asbestos mining 
occurred, found that residents who were not involved in mining had 
elevated disease risks. As noted in an article reviewing these studies, 
however, “[i]n the mining regions, it is obviously more difficult to 
separate out the potential for exposure and disease from the simple 
presence of asbestos in the soils and rocks in the absence of mining 
                                                
54. Id. at 1401. 
55. Id. at 1402. 
56. This area contains deposits of asbestos associated with ultramafic serpentine rock for-
mations along the West Bear Mountains Fault, which runs north to south within El Dorado County. 
KAREN LADD, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EL DORADO HILLS NATURALLY OCCURRING ASBESTOS 
MULTIMEDIA EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT: EL DORADO HILLS, CALIFORNIA 2-1 (2005). 
57. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, HEALTH CONSULTATION 
PUBLIC COMMENT RELEASE FOR EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY-WIDE ASBESTOS EXPOSURES 3 
(2010), available at http://www.edcoe.k12.ca.us/supts/whats_new/asbestos/documents/ATSDRHealt
hConsultation_EDH_32910.pdf. 
58. DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, REPORT ON SURFACE SOIL SAMPLING FOR 
NATURALLY OCCURRING ASBESTOS GARDEN VALLEY, CALIFORNIA 1 (2002), available at http://w
ww.dtsc.ca.gov/SiteCleanup/Projects/upload/Garden-Valley_REP_Soil_10-02.pdf. 
59. LADD, supra note 56, at 5-3. 
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activities.”60 Other reports from several regions of the world where 
mining never occurred, but where many different forms of asbestos were 
found, have shown elevated risks of disease.61 
 Health risks from NOA come from exposure, and the exposure 
pathway of greatest concern is inhalation. For exposure through 
inhalation to occur, asbestos must become airborne.62 Swift Creek 
appears to be unique in the world as a delivery system for airborne 
asbestos. In other areas, including El Dorado Hills in California, asbestos 
fibers are not likely to be airborne until some human activity—building, 
farming, driving off-road vehicles that kick up dust—disturbs the soils. 
In contrast, the landslide on Sumas Mountain continually disturbs 
asbestos-containing soils, which are then distributed by the flooding of 
Swift Creek and the Sumas River. The flooding creates new layers of 
asbestos-laden soils that are not contained under vegetation, under soils, 
or within rocks. Floods deposit asbestos-laden soils in residents’ yards 
and basements and in city storm drains. The intrusion of these asbestos-
laden soils into people’s living spaces creates possibilities of exposure 
unlike any other in the world, making it particularly difficult to estimate 
the risk from NOA in this region. 
III. THE HISTORY OF NATURALLY OCCURRING ASBESTOS AT SWIFT 
CREEK 
I've talked to the members of my staff, I've talked to the EPA, and this is 
one of the rare places in the United States that, yeah, there's asbestos 
occurring, naturally occurring in very many places around the country. 
But this is one of the very few places where water is impacting with the 
naturally occurring asbestos and then transporting it to various places. 
—Colonel Mike McCormick, U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers.63 
A. Geography and Geology 
 Swift Creek is located in the far northwestern corner of the United 
States. Canada borders Whatcom County to the north, the Pacific Ocean 
borders the county to the west, and the rugged Cascade Mountains 
                                                
60. Harper, supra note 19, at 1396. 
61. Countries reporting exposure to fibrous minerals, not all of which fall within the traditional 
definition of asbestos, include Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Austria, Corsica, Afghanistan, Italy, New 
Caledonia, China, Japan, Bulgaria, and Finland. Id. For example, in Bulgaria, tobacco farmers 
whose soils contained mineral fibers showed pleural plaques. Id. 
62. Id. at 1398. 
63. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 37. 
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dominate the eastern part of the county. Seattle is about ninety miles to 
the south; Vancouver, British Columbia, is about fifty miles to the north. 
 Moving water crisscrosses this predominately rural landscape. Swift 
Creek’s headwaters are on Sumas Mountain, a forested ridge of 
serpentine rock that marks the transition between flat farmland and the 
Cascade Mountains. In the late 1930s, a landslide took place on Sumas 
Mountain64—not a single slide, but the start of an ongoing, massive, 
slow-moving shifting of soil and rocks. No artificial trigger has been 
associated with the Sumas Mountain landslide, and engineers assume 
that a natural event, seismic or hydrological, probably triggered the 
landslide.65 Whatever the reason, the Swift Creek landslide has not been 
susceptible to the apportionment of blame. 
 The asbestos found in Swift Creek comes from the bedrock geology 
of the landslide. The serpentinite minerals on Sumas Mountain contain a 
significant proportion of asbestos. Asbestos fibers weather easily, 
breaking down into sediments that the landslide deposits in Swift Creek. 
Of the sediment load that reaches Swift Creek, engineers have estimated 
that forty-four percent of the particles are larger than sand.66 These 
particles are transported along the bottom of the streambed as bedload, 
which probably poses little hazard to humans; as for other species, 
salmon have not been found in Swift Creek since the 1970s.67 
 The problem is that much of the sediment load consists of “fine 
sediments,” and most of the fine sediments consist of chrysotile fibers.68 
                                                
64. The earliest aerial photographs showing landslide activity at Swift Creek were taken in 
1940, and interpretation of the photographs indicates that landslide activity probably began in the 
late 1930s. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 4-2. 
65. Landslides are usually triggered by single events, including earthquakes, hydrological 
events such as heavy rainfall or stream erosion, or an artificial trigger, such as excavation or blast-
ing. Id. at 4-3. One theory is that a strong earthquake in 1872 may have created conditions favorable 
to the infiltration of water during particularly heavy rains from 1930 through 1932. Id. 
66. Id. at 4-11. Efforts are ongoing to characterize the sediments and their transport. A recent 
study observed that fine sediments constituted a far smaller percentage of the bedload, but also noted 
difficulties in measurement: 
The erosion rate of the SCL was estimated to be 158 mm [per year], while the erosion 
rate of just the unvegetated toe, where most of the suspended sediment is presumed to 
originate, is approximately 1 m [per year]. The annual suspended sediment yield estimat-
ed to be approximately 910 t [per square kilometer, per year], is only about 5% of the 
bedload estimate. The suspended sediment yield is probably an underestimation because 
of the inability to sample during several of the large rain events and because of the inclu-
sion of debris flow deposits in the bedload estimate. 
Tovah M. Bayer & Scott Linneman, The Nature and Transport of the Fine-Grained Component of 
Swift Creek Landslide, Northwest Washington, 36 EARTH SURFACE PROCESSES AND LANDFORMS 
624, 637 (2011). 
67. See infra, text accompanying note 78. 
68. Bayer & Linneman, supra note 66, at 624, 673 (“The chrysotile fibers . . . make up at least 
50%, by volume, of the suspended load transported in Swift Creek . . . .”) (“The fine-grained com-
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Fine sediments travel in suspension in the water column. Swift Creek 
transports chrysotile fibers into the Sumas River, which bisects small 
towns en route to crossing the border into Canada, where it eventually 
merges into the Fraser River. It is becoming increasingly clear that 
asbestos fibers hitch a ride along this entire route.69 
B. The 1950s Through the 1970s: Floods and the Discovery of Asbestos 
 The Sumas Mountain landslide quickly clogged Swift Creek with 
sediment. During the 1950s, Whatcom County conducted drainage 
studies on Swift Creek.70 In the mid-1960s, the federal Soil Conservation 
Service, the predecessor to the Natural Resources Conservation Service, 
conducted several studies of Swift Creek sediments and the effects of 
sedimentation. It concluded that landslide stabilization was not feasible 
and recommended the construction of levees to keep Swift Creek within 
its banks.71 
 Swift Creek did not, however, stay in its banks, and the 1970s were 
Swift Creek’s high water mark in more ways than one. Severe flooding 
focused attention on Swift Creek and its sediments. By the end of the 
1970s, asbestos had been identified in both sediments and the water. 
Government agencies knew of the likely transport of asbestos to Canada 
through the river system, and the most comprehensive study of potential 
engineering approaches to the landslide conducted to date was 
completed. Almost everything that is known about Swift Creek was 
known in the 1970s, at least in broad outline. 
 A debris flow carrying 150,000 cubic yards of sediment clogged 
Swift Creek in 1971, flooding adjacent fields. In response, the Corps 
built levees, berms, and training dikes for most of the floodplain reach of 
Swift Creek.72 In the first recorded episode of sediment removal, the 
Corps dredged Swift Creek.73 
 Dikes, levees, berms, and dredging did not, of course, affect the 
source of the sediment: the landslide on Sumas Mountain. The Corps 
                                                                                                         
ponent of the [Swift Creek Landslide] is predominantly chrysotile with minor amounts of lizardite, 
illite, chlorite and occasionally hydrotalcite.”). 
69. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 4-8 to -9. The Soil Conservation Service estimated 
that around 230,000 cubic yards of sediment had been deposited in the Sumas River from Swift 
Creek over the thirty-year period that preceded 1965, and proposed a location for a sedimentation 
basin to reduce the rate of sedimentation. CONVERSE DAVIS DIXON ASSOCS., INC., PHASE II 
SUBMITTAL, GEOLOGIC AND ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, SWIFT CREEK TRIBUTARIES, SUMAS RIVER 
WATERSHED, WHATCOM COUNTY, WASHINGTON 11 (Dec. 1975) (on file with author). 
70. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 2-6. 
71. Id. at 2-9. 
72. CONVERSE DAVIS DIXON, supra note 69, at 12. 
73. The Corps excavated 70,000 cubic yards of bedload from the Swift Creek channel. Id. at 6; 
KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 2-9. 
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examined the landslide in 1971, evaluating engineering options and costs 
for the “remediation” of the landslide, but determined that the project 
was not economically justified.74 No action was taken, and Swift Creek 
flooded severely again four years later. In 1975, a large flood left a 
twelve- to twenty-inch layer of sediments in agricultural fields.75 
 That same year, in response to large, destructive floods, the Soil 
Conservation Service hired a geotechnical consulting firm, Converse 
Davis Dixon Associates, to evaluate the feasibility of engineering 
solutions to the landslide project.76 The firm’s geotechnical report now 
provides a snapshot of Swift Creek at the midpoint of its chronology, 
approximately thirty-five years after the landslide began and 
approximately thirty-five years ago. The report described the landslide as 
“teardrop-shaped” and encompassing approximately 225 acres.77 It 
observed that local residents had not reported salmon runs for “several 
years” in Swift Creek, consistent with the Washington Department of 
Fish and Wildlife’s conclusion that salmon could not utilize Swift Creek 
“in its present state.” It was possible, the consultants pointed out, that 
salmon in the Sumas River could also be affected by Swift Creek 
sediment. The report stated that a “much more broad-based study of 
sediment effects within the Sumas River” would be required to 
determine the significance of Swift Creek.78 
 Not long after the report was released, EPA, in its first recorded 
appearance in the Swift Creek saga, apparently came up with evidence of 
Swift Creek’s impact on the Sumas River. In 1976, EPA reported 
abnormally high levels of asbestos fibers in the Sumas River. The Water 
Quality Division of Environment Canada became aware of these 
findings, prompting water quality sampling and further research in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.79 
                                                
74. CONVERSE DAVIS DIXON, supra note 69, at 12. See infra text accompanying note 231, for 
a discussion of possible engineering solutions. 
75. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 5-4; David L. Blake, Risk Analysis of Agricultural 
Exposure to Airborne Asbestos in Whatcom County, Washington State 10 (May 1990) (unpublished 
Master’s thesis, Western Washington University) (on file with Western Washington University 
Library). 
76. CONVERSE DAVIS DIXON, supra note 69, at 2. 
77. Id. at 4 (observing that the landslide extended from an elevation of 1,000 feet up to an ele-
vation of around 2,600 feet; the active portion was approximately 1,500 feet wide, 4,600 feet deep, 
and 150 to 300 feet thick). 
78. Id. at 10. 
79. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 5-3. Since the time that this report was prepared, 
laboratory tests have confirmed that chrysotile asbestos is hazardous to salmon. See generally Scott 
E. Belanger et al., Effects of Chrysotile Asbestos on Coho Salmon and Green Sunfish: Evidence of 
Behavioral and Pathological Stress, 39 ENVTL. RES. 74 (1986). 
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 At about the same time, Washington State’s environmental agency, 
the Department of Ecology (Ecology), correlated Swift Creek sediment 
with the presence of asbestos in Sumas River water samples.80 Ecology 
took water samples at several points along Whatcom County rivers in 
November 1977. Both the samples from Swift Creek and from the Sumas 
River downstream of its confluence with Swift Creek contained asbestos. 
Samples from the Sumas River above Swift Creek, as well as samples 
from another creek unaffected by the Sumas Mountain landslide, did not 
contain asbestos.81 In a concise summation of the Swift Creek situation, 
the memo concluded: 
It appears that the local farmers and those persons most affected by 
the slide debris and flooding will have to institute whatever action is 
to be taken. Whether or not any of this would have an impact on the 
asbestos fibre getting into the Sumas River is unknown. Assuming 
the siltation could be controlled by sedimentation basins, etc., 
possibly the amount of fibre would be decreased but probably not 
eliminated.82 
C. The 1980s: Dredge, Haul, and Hope for the Best 
 Ecology’s observation that “those persons most affected” by Swift 
Creek sediment would have to take care of the problem correctly 
predicted a regime of local dredging and local disposal of dredged 
sediments. Whatcom County began dredging the creek bed regularly 
around 1980. The county left dredged sediments on the creek banks, 
available as free fill to anyone who wanted to haul them away. Although 
there is no record of where all of the dredged material went, it was 
probably used in building sites and roadbeds throughout the county. This 
                                                
80. Memorandum from Darrel Anderson to Dick Cunningham, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 
Sumas River, Swift Creek Drainage Asbestos Fibre Source Investigation (Feb. 11, 1977), available 
at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/77e00.pdf. A 1977 memorandum discussing the Converse Davis 
Dixon geotechnical report states: 
The presence of serpentinite [noted in the Converse Davis report] explains the source of 
asbestos fibres [sic] in the water. Although there are various forms of serpentinite, the 
basic structure shows fibreous [sic] structures and silky luster. This can be confirmed by 
water samples taken at the Sumas River water monitoring station by D.O.E, downstream 
from Sumas. Under the microscope the fibre [sic] structures can be seen on filter paper. 
Since its presence can only be identified by the filtering method one can only guess as to 
the amount of serpentinite entering the Sumas River drainage. 
Id. 
81. Samples were taken from Swift Creek, the Sumas River, and Breckinridge Creek. Breckin-
ridge Creek, which is also a tributary of the Sumas River, is north of and roughly parallel to Swift 
Creek. The Sumas Mountain landslide does not affect it. Memorandum from Shirley Prescott 
to Dick Cunningham, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Asbestos Fibre Source Sumas River 3 (1977), avail-
able at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/77e23.pdf. 
82. Id. 
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approach to the dredged sediments was viewed simply as a win-win 
situation: local residents and industries received free fill material in 
return for clearing out piles of unwanted dredged sediments. Its legacy is 
ongoing uncertainty about the location of Swift Creek sediments, 
whether or not they are capable of becoming airborne, and the extent of 
exposure to the sediments. 
 Although agencies knew that asbestos was present in sediments, the 
record of the 1980s, to the extent that it has been pieced together, does 
not indicate any efforts to address the extent to which Swift Creek 
asbestos posed a health hazard. The dangers of asbestos in occupational 
settings were well known. When the presence of asbestos in Swift Creek 
sediments and Sumas River water was first established in the late 1970s, 
asbestos litigation relating to occupational exposure was in full swing. In 
1982, when the Johns Manville Corporation filed for bankruptcy 
protection, it had been named in 17,000 asbestosis cases.83 In the absence 
of acute health effects or of a regulatory regime that extended to asbestos 
found outside the occupational setting, however, agency concern over 
asbestos in Swift Creek and the Sumas River was slow to develop. 
 In the face of neglect, Swift Creek continued to create problems. 
Despite Whatcom County’s dredging efforts, Swift Creek flooded 
severely in 1983 and again in 1984. These floods again deposited thick 
layers of asbestos-laden sediments on agricultural lands. Later in the 
1980s, Dr. Hans Schreier, a researcher from Canada’s University of 
British Columbia, published research demonstrating substantial asbestos 
fiber concentrations in the Sumas River during the 1983–84 hydrological 
cycle, showing that the Swift Creek landslide had influenced sediment 
and water quality in at least a 9.9-mile reach of the Sumas River.84 
 In several further studies, Dr. Schreier and associates attempted to 
analyze the presence of asbestos and related heavy metals in plants and 
animals in Whatcom County. Fish samples from the Sumas River in 
Washington and Canada showed elevated levels of nickel and 
manganese, trace metals associated with asbestos fibers.85 The 
documented presence of asbestos contributed to the slowly accumulating 
                                                
83. Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 
540–41 (2007). 
84. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 5-5. 
85. H. Schreier, T.G. Northcote & K. Hall, Trace Metals in Fish Exposed to Asbestos Rich 
Sediments, WATER, AIR, & SOIL POLLUTION 279, 290 (1987). A previous test had determined that, 
under laboratory conditions, chrysotile asbestos is hazardous to salmon. Belanger, supra note 79; see 
also James S. Webber & James R. Covey, Asbestos in Water, 21 CRITICAL REVS. ENVTL. CONTROL 
331, 355–58 (1991) (reviewing studies evaluating the effect of asbestos on aquatic ecosystems, 
including the Schreier and Belanger articles referenced in this note). 
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body of information demonstrating that the river system was transporting 
and distributing landslide sediments over long distances. 
D. The 1990s: Asbestos Concerns Develop 
 By 1990, agencies began to show increasing uneasiness about the 
presence of asbestos in Swift Creek sediments. The Port of Bellingham 
considered using Swift Creek sediments for fill, but reconsidered after 
the Northwest Washington Air Pollution Authority (now the Northwest 
Washington Clean Air Agency) advised the port that the sediments 
contained asbestos.86 To evaluate the presence of asbestos in Swift Creek 
sediments, Whatcom County hired a consultant to collect and analyze 
soil samples from Swift Creek’s streambed and bank. Eight samples 
contained asbestos in concentrations between one and three percent. The 
report summarized standards and advisories related to asbestos, noting 
that no standards apply to NOA, and recommended safe-handling 
procedures for using the sediments as fill.87 
 The following year, an employee of Northwest Air Pollution 
Authority attempted to determine “the maximum health risk posed by the 
[Swift Creek] deposits” by examining “what may be a worst-case human 
exposure scenario—a farmer cultivating an asbestos sediment-containing 
field.”88 The study focused on an eight-acre field characterized as “the 
only contaminated field still under cultivation”89 after inundation by the 
1975 flood. Asbestos-laden sediments therefore had been deposited 
fifteen years prior to the study.90 The study concluded that there was no 
evidence that regulatory standards had been violated. It also concluded 
that the release of asbestos by wind erosion did not appear to pose a 
significant threat in the study area.91 For more than fifteen years, this 
                                                
86. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 5-6. 
87. Id. at 5-7. 
88. Blake, supra note 75, at 10. 
89. Id. at 11. 
90. Although the soil was poor because of the effects of the flood sediments, the farmer usually 
planted a crop of corn or seed grass in May or June. An unusually wet spring during the study year, 
1990, delayed cultivation, and the farmer ultimately “agreed to disturb the study area in a typical 
manner (disc and tractor)” in September. As a result, conditions were dryer than they would have 
been in spring, likely resulting in increased dust levels that were viewed as a worst-case scenario. Id. 
91. Id. at 44. Ambient air samples were collected from five air samplers, and sampling filter 
membrane cassettes were clipped to the farmer’s collar in an effort to determine impacts within his 
breathing zone. Id. at 14. Chrysotile asbestos was identified in all samples collected from the sedi-
ment-laden field and in the sample from the breathing zone. The study concluded that neither the 
ambient samples nor the farmer’s exposure met the Occupational Health and Safety Administration 
“action level,” which required a time-weighted exposure of 0.2 fibers per cubic centimeter. Id. at 39. 
When identifying asbestos fibers, the study only counted fibers greater than 0.5 micrometers in 
length with an aspect ratio of at least five to one. Id. at 20, 42. As discussed further below, this is 
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study constituted the best—indeed, the only—scientific examination of 
the possible health risks of airborne asbestos from Swift Creek 
sediments. 
 Most efforts continued to focus on removing the stream-blocking 
sediments that continued to flow from the landslide.92 Whatcom County 
hired a consulting firm to evaluate ways to reduce flooding by restricting 
the amount of sediment that would accumulate in Swift Creek. The 
County selected an option that would involve channel dredging, 
construction of sediment traps, and relocating the confluence of the 
North and South Forks of Swift Creek. It was estimated that the plan 
would cost $600,000 to $1.6 million to implement, depending on the 
marketability of the sediment as fill material.93 Whatcom County started 
to implement the plan in 1998 by routinely dredging Swift Creek.94 It is 
believed that most of the dredged sediment, estimated at 50,000 cubic 
yards, was used as fill for the approaches to a new bridge.95 
 In Canada, the federal environmental agency, Environment Canada, 
had been conducting a study of the Fraser River system, which includes 
the Sumas River as a tributary. In 1998, Environment Canada released a 
report showing that elevated levels of nickel, chromium, copper, and 
zinc had been found in the sediments of the Sumas River system. It noted 
that elevated levels of nickel and chromium, heavy metals often 
associated with asbestos deposits, “likely” came from the Sumas 
Mountain landslide.96 
                                                                                                         
still the regulatory standard, although there is no scientific consensus that shorter asbestos fibers are 
not potentially harmful to humans. 
92. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 5-8 to -9. In 1995, Great Western Lumber, a private 
company affected by flooding, proposed to remove gravel from Swift Creek. An ad hoc committee 
of agency representatives found that samples from five plots were reported to contain only trace 
amounts of chrysotile asbestos, below the one percent threshold in occupational settings. The gravel 
removal apparently was allowed to proceed. On a broader scale, the Corps granted emergency au-
thorization to Whatcom County to dredge Swift Creek with two conditions: Whatcom County 
should pursue a long-term management plan, and the sediment could not be removed from the site. 
Because it could no longer be removed, dredged sediment was added to berms along the side of the 
Creek. In 1997, Whatcom County again needed to dredge sediment, in part because the sediments 
that had been piled into berms along the side of Swift Creek were eroding back into the creek. The 
Corps agreed to approve off-site disposal of the sediment, provided that clearance could be obtained 
from the Whatcom County Health Department. After consulting with the Northwest Air Pollution 
Authority, the Health Department replied that the material could be used as fill because it contained 
less than one percent asbestos, and further stated that the asbestos-laden soil did not require a cover 
or warning signs while in transport. Id. 
93. Id. at 1-2. 
94. Id. at 2-8. 
95. Id. at 3-1. 
96. MINISTRY OF WATER, LAND, AND AIR PROT., SUMMARY OF SURFACE WATER QUALITY 
SAMPLING ON SUMAS RIVER AND TRIBUTARIES, ABBOTSFORD, BRITISH COLUMBIA 7–8 (2004), 
available at http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/epd/regions/lower_mainland/water_quality/reports/ 
sumas_river/sumas_river.pdf. 
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E. 2000 to 2005: Inklings of a Regulatory Regime 
 During the first few years of the twenty-first century, sedimentation 
and flooding, not asbestos, remained the major concern relating to Swift 
Creek. In a 2001 Whatcom County Council committee meeting, for 
example, members of the County Council asked if Swift Creek was “the 
creek that has something in the sediment that makes it difficult to get rid 
of the sediment.” Whatcom County’s Public Works Director replied that 
“Swift Creek has a form of asbestos that is not the type that has caused 
lung problems, but it is still asbestos.” He further noted that the county 
could not use all of the sediment for fill and that some of the dredged 
sediment was piling up. “The trick is to find a user for it at the time it is 
being excavated. Generally, no one is willing to use it if it costs to pile it 
and then move it again.”97 At least at the local level, Swift Creek 
continued to be viewed solely as a flood problem. 
 To reduce flooding, Whatcom County tried to obtain permits to 
build a sediment trap on Swift Creek but found that it was working in a 
new regulatory environment. The Washington Department of Fish and 
Wildlife objected to the sediment-trap permits on the grounds that the 
dredged, asbestos-laden sediments could reenter state surface waters.98 
Although the Corps tried to create a work-around to allow dredging 
while meeting the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife’s 
concerns, the sediment-trap project never went forward.99 This action 
represented the start of a new era for Swift Creek with nonlocal agencies 
concerned about the impacts of dredging the creek. 
F. 2005 to the Present: Federal Agencies Come to Swift Creek 
 EPA again became involved in Swift Creek in 2005. To reduce the 
constant risk of flooding, Whatcom County had applied to the Corps for 
a permit to allow dredging and bank stabilization. EPA responded to the 
Corps’ public notice of the permit application by requesting that the 
Corps not issue a permit until public and environmental health concerns 
were addressed.100 
                                                
97. Minutes of the Whatcom Cnty. Council Pub. Works and Capital Projects Comm. 3 
(Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/council/2001/minutes/Public_Works_for
_February_6.doc. 
98. 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 2-3. 
99. Id. 
100. EPA recommended that a method to monitor and track the use of dredged materials 
should be developed, that there should be no minimum threshold for the requirement of permits for 
the removal of materials, that the stockpiled material should be secured from unauthorized removal, 
and that a public information project should be developed to inform potential users of the risks asso-
ciated with NOA. Id. at 2-4. 
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 In response, Whatcom County notified the Corps that the 
Washington State Department of Health would help the county assess the 
health risks associated with the Swift Creek dredged material. The 
county further pledged not to move dredged sediments away from the 
banks of Swift Creek until the health risks were determined. This 
cautionary approach was memorialized in the Corps’ permit, which 
required Whatcom County to “securely store” all dredged sediments “at 
the project site on adjacent uplands” and prohibited the removal of the 
dredged sediments “for any use including as fill material.”101 Whatcom 
County could no longer pile sediments on the creek banks and allow 
residents and construction companies to haul the sediments away as free 
fill material. Instead, the sediments had to be stored on private property 
on the banks of Swift Creek. 
 With this permit in hand, Whatcom County launched the “Big Dig” 
in the summer of 2005. It dredged approximately 85,000 cubic yards 
from one reach of Swift Creek, stockpiling all of the material along the 
creek’s banks. The stockpiled materials formed high levees which, it was 
believed at the time would be a temporary storage solution until a better 
solution could be developed. In an attempt to prevent further exposure, 
fences, gates, and warning signs were installed along several access 
points, although these measures have not stopped people from walking 
and even riding off-road recreational vehicles through creek sediments 
and on top of the levees.102 “Securing” the sediments in large creek-side 
berms may have actually attracted recreational use, which has the 
potential to expose more residents to asbestos-laden dust. The agencies 
themselves were not sure how much risk the sediments posed, and 
throughout 2005 made further efforts to analyze the extent of asbestos in 
the soils and the risk of exposure to airborne asbestos.103 Federal, state, 
and county health officials, including ATSDR, the Washington 
Department of Health, and the Whatcom County Health Department, 
                                                
101. Id. at 2-4. 
102. HEALTH CONSULTATION, supra note 12, at 5. 
103. Id. at 8. The Whatcom County Health Department took sediment samples from Swift 
Creek in June 2005 and found that fine-grained sediments contained as much as forty-six percent 
chrysotile asbestos, as well as trace levels of amphibole fibers. Id. Western Washington University, 
in nearby Bellingham, Washington, conducted independent analysis of samples from Swift Creek’s 
banks and streambed. The asbestos concentration was not noted, but chrysotile asbestos fibers were 
observed. Id. During dredging in August 2005, Whatcom County and the Washington State Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries took personal air samples from workers’ breathing zones for roughly 
three to five hours over the course of two days. Asbestos fibers were detected in twelve of the six-
teen samples, but most samples had concentrations below analytical reporting levels, and all samples 
were below the permissible exposure limit. It was noted, however, that these results were influenced 
by the analytical method used, which was unable to detect the small asbestos fibers characteristic of 
Swift Creek sediments. 
2012] The Emerging Legal Problem of Naturally Occurring Asbestos 149 
conducted a site visit in August 2005. They walked past a gate with signs 
prohibiting the removal of sediments and then climbed to the top of the 
levees that contained stockpiled sediments from the previous dredging. 
Dredging was still occurring at the time, and the health officials observed 
that “[n]umerous pieces of heavy equipment were removing sediment 
from the creek and placing it on the bank or moving it around on the 
levees,”104 as a water tanker truck sprayed water on the levee soils to 
minimize dust. Researchers observed off-road recreational vehicle tracks 
running through Swift Creek sediments and photographed a child’s big-
wheel toy sitting adjacent to a levee.105 
 The resultant health consultation report, issued in March 2006, 
identified numerous potential airborne exposure pathways for asbestos, 
including windblown dust from piles, off-road recreational vehicles 
stirring up dust in Swift Creek or on levees, dust in yards where 
sediments were used as fill, tilling or working earth where sediments had 
been deposited, and dredging for flood control.106 The report further 
observed, “downstream exposures to asbestos are possible if there is 
significant deposition along Sumas River.” Although Dr. Schreier’s 
publications from the 1980s were not cited, the health consultation report 
did note the possibility of impacts on the Sumas and Fraser Rivers in 
Canada.107 
 The health consultation report concluded that the health risk from 
asbestos was “indeterminate.” In particular, it found that “[c]urrent 
knowledge of asbestos content and physical properties in Swift Creek 
sediments is insufficient for determining human health risks and 
appropriate end use of dredged sediments” and recommended that the 
asbestos in Swift Creek should be fully characterized.108 The report’s 
primary recommendation encouraged the agencies to develop a 
collaborative sampling plan so as to fully characterize of the asbestos in 
the sediments. With that recommendation in hand, Whatcom County’s 
Health Department asked EPA to characterize the asbestos by defining 
the type and concentrations of asbestos.109 
 Starting in April of 2006, EPA performed four phases of 
investigation: site reconnaissance, integrated assessment, activity-based 
                                                
104. Id. at 6. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 13. 
107. Id. at 12 ( “[The Department of Health] has no information on whether Sumas River is 
used as a source of drinking water in British Columbia, or what the impacts are on Fraser River’s 
water quality.”) 
108. Id. at 4. 
109. 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 2-5. 
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sampling and analysis, and risk evaluation.110 During the site 
reconnaissance, conducted in April 2006, EPA collected sediment and 
water samples. Polarized light microscopy detected chrysotile asbestos in 
all eight samples. The concentration of asbestos ranged from trace 
amounts to approximately thirty percent. 
 The integrated assessment, conducted in May, was a site 
investigation that assessed the necessity for clean-up at the site.111 EPA 
assessed soil and air filter samples from the levee of dredged material 
piles on the south side of Swift Creek. Asbestos levels in those soil 
samples ranged from trace amounts to 4.4%. Those soil samples also 
showed elevated levels of three heavy metals: chromium, nickel, and 
vanadium. The air samples included stationary samples and personal 
samples. Personal air sampling involves placing an air-sampling pump 
on a worker with the air inlet placed near the person’s breathing zone.112 
While asbestos was found in all of the air samples, the average 
concentration for the personal samples was more than ten times greater 
than the average concentration of the stationary samples.113 
 Based on the integrated assessment, EPA concluded “the dredged 
material piles at the site were contaminated with asbestos and metals and 
that people working or traveling across the site are potentially exposed to 
these contaminants.” EPA further concluded “asbestos could be 
migrating to off-site locations, including nearby residential areas.”114 
 The third phase of EPA’s investigation, activity-based sampling, 
was intended to simulate exposures to asbestos that could result from 
common activities at the site. EPA workers, dressed in moon suits with 
respirators containing filters designed to collect asbestos fibers, 
performed activities described as “loading/hauling, raking/spreading, and 
recreation (walking/jogging/biking).” All of the samples from the 
workers’ air filters contained asbestos.115 
 Activity-based sampling was an important input into the final stage 
of EPA’s 2006 investigation, the risk assessment. EPA concluded that 
for all evaluated activities the excess lifetime cancer risk from asbestos 
was greater than one in one million (1 x 10-6), and the risk was greater 
than one in ten thousand (1 x 10-4) for some activities.116 These risk 
levels correspond to threshold determinations for further agency action. 
                                                
110. Id. at 2-5, 4-1. 
111. The assessment was “integrated” because it applied both criteria for a time-critical re-
moval action and the criteria for listing on the National Priorities List. Id. at 5-1. 
112. Id. at 6-1. 
113. Id. at 5-1 to -2. 
114. Id. at 5-2. 
115. Id. at 6-3. 
116. Id. at 7-2. 
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EPA noted that, under the Superfund program, a risk level below one in 
one million is considered de minimis, while a risk level greater than one 
in ten thousand may form the basis for a cleanup action.117 
 The risk assessment resulted in the conclusion that “[r]esidents 
living near the Swift Creek Asbestos Site should limit exposure to Swift 
Creek dredged materials,” and that contact with off-site materials could 
also lead to indeterminate exposure risks.118 EPA further recommended 
that “dredged materials no longer be removed from the site without 
personal protection and that it not be taken to other sites where further 
exposure is possible, as has been done in the past.”119 EPA concluded 
that a successful response to Swift Creek asbestos would have to be 
collaborative, involving many agencies 
 In response to this risk assessment, EPA used its removal authority 
under CERCLA to “reduce the potential for an uncontrolled release of 
asbestos from the dredged materials presently stockpiled along Swift 
Creek . . . .”120 EPA used its removal authority in November of 2007 to 
re-grade the site and apply a dust suppressing “tackifier” compound to 
the dredged sediment piles in order to limit wind dispersal of asbestos 
fibers. 
 The Washington Department of Health and ATSDR also responded 
to the risk assessment by preparing a health consultation that focused on 
health statistics and public health issues.121 The 2008 report reviewed 
existing health statistics, comparing the number of cancer cases 
identified in the community near Swift Creek with the number of cancer 
cases seen in two reference populations. The report concluded that “[i]n 
the area of interest, no mesothelioma cases were identified from 1992 to 
2004. Lung and bronchus cancer rates were in the area of interest, were 
similar to Washington State rates, and were not significantly different 
from Whatcom County as a whole.”122 Although the small number of 
                                                
117. Id. at 7-1. The Washington State Department of Ecology generally uses a maximum level 
of risk of one in one million for residential exposures and one in one hundred thousand for industrial 
exposures. Id. 
118. Id. at 8-1. 
119. Id. 
120. JAMES PETERSON, ECOLOGY & ENVTL., INC., SWIFT CREEK ASBESTOS SITE: TIME 
CRITICAL REMOVAL ACTION REPORT EVERSON, WASHINGTON 2-3 (2008), available at http://yose
mite.epa.gov/r10/CLEANUP.NSF/sites/sumasmtndocs/$FILE/Swift+CK+Removal+Rpt+Final_Apr
2008.pdf. See infra text accompanying note 151, for a discussion of the basis and extent of EPA’s 
removal authority under CERCLA. 
121. WASH. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EVALUATION OF HEALTH STATISTICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
DATA GAPS RELATED TO EXPOSURE TO NATURALLY OCCURRING ASBESTOS FROM SWIFT CREEK 
(Feb. 22, 2008) [hereinafter PUBLIC HEALTH EVALUATION], available at http://www.doh.wa.gov/eh
p/oehas/pubs/swiftcreekasbestos08.pdf (prepared under a cooperative agreement with ATSDR). 
122. Id. at 10. 
152 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 2:125 
cases resulted in “wide confidence intervals around calculated values,” 
the lack of an observed increase in the number of cancer cases led to a 
recommendation not to conduct further epidemiological analyses.123 
 The health consultation report also focused on data gaps. Observing 
that EPA’s sampling and analysis had provided “much-needed 
information,” the report noted that, “[u]nfortunately, it is difficult to 
extrapolate results of activity based sampling to other scenarios, 
including indoor exposure. Consequently, it is difficult to determine 
what public health actions are appropriate without a more complete 
picture of potential exposures.”124 Because of these data gaps, the report 
concluded that Swift Creek asbestos presents an “indeterminate” public 
health hazard.125 
 In addition, the health consultation report notes that data gaps exist 
in areas relating to both occupational and non-occupational exposure. 
Occupational exposure could occur from a number of activities and 
locations: future creek dredging; stream restoration efforts (which were 
halted once asbestos was identified); road repairs where Swift Creek 
sediments had been used as fill or bed material; and at Great Western 
Lumber, a local sawmill that may have used Swift Creek sediment in its 
lumber yard.126 
 Non-occupational exposure primarily originates from dust blown 
into or tracked into homes. This exposure is not limited to homes near 
Swift Creek; as the health consultation report notes, people have used 
Swift Creek sediments as fill throughout Whatcom County: 
The full extent to which asbestos-containing sediments have been 
used off-site is uncertain, and will likely never be completely 
known, but an estimated 2 million cubic yards were moved off-site. 
Anecdotal information suggests that Swift Creek sediments have 
been used as fill for a variety of private (e.g., driveways, parking 
lots, log yards, and horse arenas) and public projects (e.g., 
transportation projects). A potential pathway of significant concern 
is the in home exposure pathway. If asbestos containing fill was 
used at or near residential properties, there is potential that asbestos 
may have been tracked into the home over time. Since people spend 
the majority of time indoors, this potentially presents a frequent and 
prolonged exposure pathway.127 
                                                
123. Id. at 24. 
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125. Id. at 13. 
126. Id. at 11–12. 
127. Id. at 11. 
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 Flooding and the possible dispersion of asbestos sediments beyond 
Swift Creek also presented an uncertainty, or data gap, with regard to 
downstream exposure. The health consultation report observed that 
because Swift Creek flows into the Sumas River, flooding of the Sumas 
River could also deposit asbestos into the floodplain, homes, and 
basements of the Sumas River basin.128 
 That uncertainty did not last long. Nature soon provided scientists 
with the opportunity to fill this “data gap” when heavy winter rains 
caused the Sumas River to flood in the first days of 2009. EPA’s 
subsequent sampling in May 2009 yielded sobering results. Chrysotile 
asbestos and some actinolite asbestos were detected in upland soil and 
bank sediment samples collected from Swift Creek and from the Sumas 
River downstream from Swift Creek. Chrysotile asbestos was detected in 
surface water samples. The concentrations detected were much higher 
than those detected in earlier sampling efforts, which focused on dredged 
sediments. Concentrations as high as 27% in upland soil samples and up 
to 22.75% in bank sediment samples collected along the Sumas River 
downstream from Swift Creek. Surface water samples detected up to 879 
million asbestos fibers per liter in the Sumas River downstream from 
Swift Creek.129 Disturbingly, the level of asbestos in the soils did not 
appear to diminish significantly as the Sumas River flowed north to the 
Canadian borders. Sampling indicated that upland soils at a site just 
south of the border contained 26.75% asbestos.130 
 In response to the potential, but still “indeterminate,” risk of 
exposure to asbestos created by the flood conditions, EPA proposed a 
number of measures that property owners along the Sumas River should 
take. These measures included removing shoes before entering a house, 
dusting with a wet cloth rather than a feather duster or dry cloth, and 
keeping out of areas where asbestos may be present. Additionally, EPA 
provided specific advice for pets: “If they do get dirty, bathe the pet 
(brushing can release fibers into the air).”131 
 For farmers, homeowners, and businesses to take such inconvenient 
precautionary measures, they would need to believe both that asbestos in 
the soils created a health risk and that taking off their shoes and washing 
their pets would have a material effect on the health risks that they face. 
                                                
128. Id. 
129. OFFICE OF ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGION 10, SOIL, 
SEDIMENT AND SURFACE WATER SAMPLING, SUMAS MOUNTAIN NATURALLY-OCCURRING 
ASBESTOS SITE, WHATCOM COUNTY, WASHINGTON 7 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://yosemite.
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130. Id. at 16. 
131. Id. at 8. 
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Because of the uncertainty surrounding asbestos from Swift Creek, many 
local people doubt those propositions. 
G. Risks from Sumas Mountain/Swift Creek Asbestos 
 To date, health agencies have concluded that (1) a “public health 
hazard” exists for people conducting activities regularly on dredge piles; 
(2) an “unacceptable cancer risk” of greater than one in ten thousand, or 
one excess cancer in ten thousand exposed people, results from some 
activities; (3) risk factors may be “underestimated” because exposures 
may occur at other locations, such as indoor environments of residences 
near Swift Creek; (4) there is no evidence of elevated rates of asbestos 
related disease such as mesothelioma and lung cancer in the community 
near Swift Creek compared to Whatcom County or Washington State as 
a whole; and, (5) nonetheless, an “indeterminate public health hazard” 
exists for people who may be exposed to Swift Creek asbestos off-site, 
such as indoor locations or areas where dredged material was used as 
fill.132 
 While the agencies’ caution and lack of certainty are defensible 
from a legal and scientific perspective, it is very difficult for the general 
public to understand the ramifications of such vague and seemingly 
conflicting conclusions. Nor is it apparent to citizens why the agencies 
that “caused” the problem by proclaiming that the area is risky can 
neither solve the problems created by Swift Creek asbestos nor explain 
clearly what needs to be done to solve the problem. 
 In November 2007, multiple agencies hosted a public information 
session to discuss EPA’s risk assessment with local citizens. 
Representatives from nine federal, state, and local agencies, including 
ATSDR, EPA, the Corps, the Washington State Departments of Ecology, 
Health, and Natural Resources, the Northwest Clear Air Agency, and 
Whatcom County Departments of Public Works and Health met in a 
community center near Swift Creek. The Administrator of EPA Region 
10 participated, as did the Seattle District commander for the Corps. 
 The first speaker, the owner of a lumber company who had 
periodically dredged the areas of Swift Creek that ran through his 
property, questioned the significance of the risk assessment: 
[O]ne [value] that ended up outside of the range of reasonable risk 
was the child play and that was two hours a day for a full year, 350 
days a year for 10 years. I mean, that's just not a—I mean, that 
doesn't seem realistic to me and that one, like I said, was again was 
from a maximum value, not a mean value. So it just seems like 
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we're taking—the information we're basing these decisions on are 
really from an extreme and I just can't get my head around this, how 
we can make these decisions that are affecting this community 
based on—it seems like kind of iffy numbers . . . .133 
 EPA personnel responded that the analysis was inherently 
uncertain, but that they were concerned about potential health effects. 
The following exchange epitomizes the difficulties of the Swift Creek 
situation, where agencies cannot state clearly that the situation is 
dangerous but also cannot assure the public that the situation is safe 
MS. LORI COHEN: Can I just add to that? The one other thing I did 
want to say is you are asking for like kind of a bright line as to 
what's safe or not safe and I don't think we quite addressed that. 
There really is no bright line. Asbestos is a human carcinogen and 
there's no amount that's truly safe and so you do have to make these 
sort of assessments and evaluations to judge what kind of exposures 
you might be—what kind of exposures might be there and what the 
potential increased risk of cancer is to an individual. So I don't think 
we could ever say there is an absolute bright line of what is safe. 
MR. TOM WESTERGREEN: You still have to make a decision. You 
can say that about everything in life, that there's risk in everything 
you do, and that's what the frustration here is, Lori, is coming up 
with that level . . . .134 
 The absence of a bright line permeates the range of regulatory 
responses available to NOA in general, and to Swift Creek in particular. 
“Business as usual” is not possible because of the risk, but the risk is not 
so clearly elevated that significant resources are available for a response. 
IV. “A SEAM BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES”: REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
MR. CHUCK GELWICKS: I want to know who is going to take 
responsibility when it's a foot thick on our land. That's what I want to 
know. 
MR. MIKE MCCORMICK: If we are called for the flood fight we will work 
with you on that, on the flood fight, but the impact to the land and 
everything else, I think that's really what you're getting to, the 
detrimental impacts to your farmland. 
MR. CHUCK GELWICKS: Yes. 
MR. MIKE MCCORMICK: That's what you're talking about? 
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MR. CHUCK GELWICKS: Everybody's, yes. 
MR. MIKE MCCORMICK: I think that's beyond my authority. 
MR. CHUCK GELWICKS: Well, whose authority would it be? 
MR. MIKE MCCORMICK: I don't know, sir. 
—Swift Creek Meeting at Glen Echo Community Club.135 
 The regulation of asbestos can best be described as erratic. It is a 
hazardous waste for purposes of some laws but not for others. 
Commercial asbestos is extensively regulated at the federal level, but this 
authority does not always apply to NOA. Federal, state, and local 
governments all have some type of authority that they may be able to use 
to address NOA, but the extent to which agencies must act to address 
NOA concerns is less clear. As the Corps District Commander observed 
at a public meeting in 2007, “where we are right now is a seam between 
the authorities. And that’s not an answer you want to hear, but to the 
extent I understand it, it’s probably the reality.”136 Although a seam 
between the authorities is an uncomfortable location, it does dictate 
cooperation and may lead to creativity. Whether any or all of these 
authorities will be able to address NOA at Swift Creek, or whether NOA 
will turn out to be a problem without a regulatory solution, is the subject 
of Part V. First, however, the following sections describe existing 
regulatory authority. 
A. Hazardous Waste Regulation 
1. CERCLA: Release, Liability, and Removal 
 Asbestos is classified as a hazardous substance under CERCLA.137 
CERCLA focuses primarily on liability and contains only one regulatory 
                                                
135. Id. at 62–63. 
136. Id. at 35 (quoting Mike McCormick, Seattle District Commander, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers). 
137. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(E) (2006) (referencing hazardous air pollutants listed under 42 
U.S.C. § 7412(b)); 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2011) (asbestos on list of hazardous substances); see also 
United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1153 (2003) (where parties stipulated that 
asbestos is a hazardous substance under CERCLA). In the context of a discussion of CERCLA lia-
bility, EPA representatives told local governments in Whatcom County that asbestos is “not a haz-
ardous waste.” See Minutes of the Whatcom Cnty. Council Special Surface Water Work Session, 
supra note 2, at 3 (“So far, asbestos is not designated as a hazardous waste. . . . For now, they are 
just saying that this is not a hazardous waste.”). While asbestos is not defined as a hazardous waste 
under CERCLA, its designation as a hazardous substance makes asbestos subject to CERCLA’s 
reporting and liability requirements. See infra, text accompanying notes 138–41. The speaker at the 
Whatcom County Council Special Surface Water Work Session may have been thinking about the 
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provision, which requires any person in charge of a facility to report any 
release of hazardous substances from the facility.138 “Facility” includes 
“any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, 
disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located,”139 and “release” 
means “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, 
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the 
environment.”140 The reporting requirement for asbestos is triggered 
upon release of one pound of friable asbestos.141 
 CERCLA’s reporting requirements technically are broad enough to 
require reporting by landowners (“in charge” of a “facility”) when 
sufficient asbestos is “released” (removed by floods or wind) from a pile 
of dredged materials in which asbestos has been disposed of142 or stored. 
It could theoretically require Whatcom County or other agency 
employees to report releases when dredging or otherwise moving 
asbestos-laden soils. This would, of course, require continuous 
monitoring and measurement. 
 In addition to the reporting requirements, CERCLA establishes 
liability for owners and operators of facilities, as well as arrangers (any 
person who arranged for disposal or transport) and transporters of 
hazardous substances.143 Liability accrues for the release of a hazardous 
substance144 and can extend to the costs of any removal or remedial 
actions taken by the federal or state government, any other necessary 
response costs, and damages to natural resources.145 
                                                                                                         
fact that asbestos is not regulated as a hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA). 
 138. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2010). 
139. Id. § 9601(9). 
140. Id. § 9601(12). 
141. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2011); Memorandum from Michael S. Alushin & Glenn L. Unter-
berger, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional Counsels, Regions I–X, Inclusion of CERCLA Sec-
tion 103(a) Counts in Asbestos NESHAP Cases (1990), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance
/resources/policies/civil/caa/stationary/inclu-asbes-rpt.pdf (“Even though CERCLA regulations do 
not define the term ‘friable asbestos,’ the reportable quantity should not be interpreted to include one 
pound of ‘any material containing more than 1 percent asbestos by weight that hand pressure can 
crumble . . . .’ 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (definition of friable asbestos under Clean Air Act).”). 
142. Under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, “disposal” encompasses any “discharge, deposit, in-
jection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any 
land or water so that such [waste] or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emit-
ted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). This 
definition from the Solid Waste Disposal Act is applied to CERCLA through 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29). 
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2010). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(d). 
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 These definitions require human action: asbestos must be disposed 
of or transported, or its disposal or transport must be arranged.146 
Asbestos that merely washes up along the banks of a river system likely 
would not fall within this definition,147 but asbestos that has been 
dredged, hauled, or stored on the bank of a stream probably would 
qualify if it were released into the environment. 
 For decades, Whatcom County residents, companies, and 
government agencies have transported asbestos-laden sediments and 
used those sediments for purposes that have not been documented but 
that likely include the construction of roads, parking lots, and trails. It 
has been estimated that two million cubic yards of sediment have been 
dredged and removed from Swift Creek.148 Beginning in the late 1940s, 
the Corps was responsible for dredging Swift Creek as a flood control 
measure. Later, the Whatcom County Public Works River and Flood 
Division assumed the responsibility of dredging and maintaining Swift 
Creek.149 Further, private property owners, in the interest of preventing 
flooding, allowed the storage of sediments on their land. In theory, any 
of these potentially responsible parties could be liable under Superfund. 
 To date, this expansive web of potential Superfund liability has 
made the entire issue of liability recede into the background. In a 
situation in which almost every entity lives in a glass house, the decision 
to throw a stone is fraught with difficulty. When EPA discussed liability 
with the Whatcom County Council, EPA warned the council that “there 
is liability associated with Superfund” and that it could affect private 
property owners. The concluding message, however, was that 
“Superfund isn’t interested unless there is a specific risk.”150 
                                                
146. “Transport” means “the movement of a hazardous substance by any mode.” Id. § 
9601(26). 
147. A recent federal district court case could cause uncertainty about this conclusion, to the 
extent that any asbestos transported by the river could be shown to have originated on the dredge 
piles. The court found that the Washington Department of Transportation was liable under CERCLA 
as an “arranger” because it designed a storm water drainage system that deposited roadway contam-
inants in the environment. United States v. Wash. Dep’t of Transp., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1015 
(W.D. Wash. 2010). If a reviewing court found that the criteria of the case were met—that an entity 
designed, constructed and operated the dredge piles, that their sole function was related to the collec-
tion and disposal of hazardous runoff, that the arranger knew that the system contained hazardous 
substances, and that there was an actual release of a hazardous substance—it is possible that arrang-
er liability could apply. 
148. PUBLIC HEALTH EVALUATION, supra note 121, at 11. 
149. HEALTH CONSULTATION, supra note 12, at 5. 
150. Minutes of the Whatcom Cnty. Council Pub. Works and Capital Projects Comm., supra 
note 97, at 7. CERCLA establishes an “act of God” defense, which applies when a release of a haz-
ardous substance “and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by” an act of God. 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2010). An act of God is defined as “an unanticipated grave natural disaster or 
other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of 
which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight.” Id. § 
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 Neither the liability provisions of CERCLA nor the release-
reporting obligation appear likely to result in the kind of long-term 
solution to the Swift Creek asbestos problem sought by agencies and 
residents. CERCLA also provides EPA with more promising tools by 
granting it authority under two distinct cleanup classifications: removal 
actions and remedial actions. EPA is authorized to initiate removal or 
remedial actions at sites where the release or substantial threat of release 
of a pollutant may pose an imminent and substantial danger to public 
health and welfare.151 Removal or remedial activities are not authorized 
in response to a release, or threat of release, of “a naturally occurring 
substance in its unaltered form, or altered solely through naturally 
occurring processes or phenomena, from a location where it is naturally 
found.”152 This limitation should not apply to Swift Creek asbestos that 
has been dredged or moved, because it is not in a location “where it is 
naturally found.” 
 EPA’s removal authority over NOA that has been altered or 
transported by human activities is supported by a number of federal 
district court cases. In cases involving Libby, Montana vermiculite mine 
that exposed workers and residents to high levels of asbestos, the 
responsible party strenuously contested EPA’s removal activities on the 
grounds that the asbestos was a naturally occurring substance. The 
federal district court considered the fact that rain washed material from 
the mine into a nearby river, and concluded that “[a]ny asbestos that 
washed off disturbed areas at the Mine Site to the Kootenai River was 
not in its ‘unaltered form, or altered solely by naturally occurring 
processes or phenomena.’ ”153 
 In a similar case, a mining company contended that arsenic, a 
naturally occurring element found around a mine, was exempt from 
regulation under CERCLA. The court held, however, that “the arsenic is 
not found in its unaltered form because mining, an unnatural process, has 
                                                                                                         
9607(b)(1). Under the act of God defense, a potentially responsible party would likely contend that 
the Swift Creek landslide constitutes an unanticipated natural disaster, however slow-moving and 
permanent it may be. The potentially responsible party would further need to establish that the dam-
ages resulting from the natural disaster were caused solely by the natural disaster. The agencies that 
conducted that dredging might be able to contend that the damage could not have been prevented or 
avoided by the exercise of due care and that their actions constituted due care and foresight to pre-
vent greater damage. However, this approach might not be available to the private parties who trans-
ported or received sediment, unless they could convincingly argue that no due care or foresight 
could have prevented damage because the nature of the materials were unknown. In light of the strict 
liability nature of CERCLA, this would be a departure from the law’s current interpretation. 
151. Id. § 9604(b). 
152. Id. § 9604(a)(3)(A). 
153. United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (2003); see also id. at 
1148. 
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altered its location.”154 In another mining case, a court found that acid 
mine drainage was not a naturally occurring release, even though it 
consisted of naturally occurring substances, because “mining constitutes 
an artificial alteration rather than a naturally occurring process or 
phenomenon.”155 A court has also summarily rejected the application of 
the exception to “naturally occurring” metals in soil, noting that the 
metals were located in fill material brought onto the site from another 
location. The court held that they were not in the location where they 
would be “naturally found.”156 These cases, which view the movement of 
soils as sufficient alteration to avoid the exclusion, support EPA’s 
response authority over sediments that have been exposed through 
dredging or relocated to sites in which they did not naturally occur. 
 EPA’s response authority over sediments distributed through 
flooding is a more open question. CERCLA would only exempt NOA 
“in its unaltered form . . . from a location where it is naturally found” 
from EPA’s response authority. NOA is not “naturally found” in 
basements or municipal storm drains, where it appears after flooding. 
Although a natural process delivered the asbestos, the portion the 
CERCLA statute that refers to natural processes addresses the alteration 
of asbestos not its transportation or location (“altered solely through 
naturally occurring processes or phenomena”). Thus, if EPA chose to 
exercise its response authority over flood-distributed asbestos, the 
exceptions in CERCLA should not prevent it from doing so.157 
 If it is accepted that EPA has response authority over at least some 
of the asbestos from Swift Creek sediments, the next question is the 
scope and nature of the actions that it is authorized to take. CERCLA 
defines a remedial action as permanent, whereas removal actions are 
defined as actions consistent with future remedial actions or actions that 
are taken under emergency authority. Remedial actions can only be 
initiated once a site has been listed on the National Priorities List (NPL), 
which is an inventory of hazardous waste sites that meet specific criteria 
based on their individual Hazard Ranking System (HRS) scores. Swift 
Creek has not been listed on the NPL, and it is not known whether the 
asbestos contamination present at Swift Creek would generate a HRS 
score sufficient to list the site on the NPL.158 The uncertain health threat 
                                                
154. Monarch Greenback v. Monticello Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1080 (D. Idaho 1999). 
155. United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1548 (1992). 
156. Containerport Grp. v. Am. Fin. Grp., 128 F. Supp. 2d 470, 482 n.16 (2001). 
157. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3)(A) (2010). 
158. A site can be listed on the NPL if it meets one of the following three criteria: 
(1) The release scores sufficiently high pursuant to the Hazard Ranking System . . . . 
(2) A state . . . has designated a release as its highest priority. States may make only one 
such designation; or 
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posed by NOA makes a risk determination difficult, and local politicians 
and EPA officials do not appear interested in pursuing an NPL listing.159 
Further, personnel involved in the Swift Creek issue may have believed, 
incorrectly, that CERCLA’s liability provisions would not apply if Swift 
Creek was not included on the NPL.160 
 Unlike remedial actions, removal actions can occur on sites not 
scored using the HRS or listed on the NPL.161 Although CERCLA does 
not define “removal action,” the statute does define “remove” and 
“removal”: 
The terms “remove” or “removal” means the cleanup or removal of 
released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions 
as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of 
hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be 
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of 
release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, 
or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, 
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to 
the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or 
threat of release. The term includes, in addition, without being 
limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access, 
provision of alternative water supplies, [and] temporary evacuation 
and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for.162 
 The National Contingency Plan (NCP), which consists of the 
regulations that govern the selection and implementation of removal and 
remedial actions,163 states that removal actions must “be terminated after 
$2 million has been obligated for the action or 12 months have elapsed 
from the date removal activities begin on site.”164 
                                                                                                         
(3) The release satisfies all of the following criteria: 
(i) The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry has issued a health advi-
sory that recommends dissociation of individuals from the release; 
(ii) EPA determines that the release poses a significant threat to public health; and 
(iii) EPA anticipates that it will be more cost-effective to use its remedial authority 
than to use removal authority to respond to the release. 
40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c) (2010). 
159. Interview by Douglas Naftz with Luke Loeffler, Congressional Aide, Representative Rick 
Larsen (Feb. 2009). 
160. Id. 
161. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (2010). 
162. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (2010). 
163. The full title of the NCP is the “National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contin-
gency Plan.” Id. § 9605(a). The NCP is located at 40 C.F.R. § 300. For the government to recover 
costs, its removal and remedial activities must be “not inconsistent with” the NCP. 42 U.S.C. § 
9607(a)(4)(A). For private parties to recover costs, their activities must be “consistent” with the 
NCP. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
164. 40 C.F.R. 300.415(b)(5) (2010). 
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 In November 2007, EPA approved a Time Critical Removal Action 
(TCRA) at Swift Creek. EPA intended the removal action to “reduce the 
potential for an uncontrolled release of asbestos” through the application 
of a dust suppressant, or tackifier, to the sediment piles. EPA also re-
graded the stockpiles in an effort to prevent erosion.165 It appears, 
however, that these stopgap measures may not have worked as intended. 
Premature failure of the tackifier has been observed along the sediment 
piles, and erosion of the sediment pilings continues, especially during 
periods of high creek flow.166 These stopgap measures alone may not 
adequately protect public health and welfare of the surrounding 
community. 
 The NCP arguably only requires EPA to abate, minimize, stabilize, 
or mitigate the threat to public health that resulted in the removal 
action.167 The goal of EPA’s removal authority, however, is to prevent 
“imminent and substantial danger to public health and welfare.”168 This 
language implies that the removal action should ensure that this 
“substantial danger” no longer exists. Although EPA certainly intended 
its actions to minimize asbestos exposure pathways, many such exposure 
pathways remain. Recent observations suggest that the 2007 removal 
action did not adequately address the exposure pathways originally 
targeted in the removal action. It appears likely that the public health risk 
that led to the removal action will simply recur—as many times as 
EPA’s short-term measures fail or wear out. 
 The twelve-month limit on removal activities, if measured from the 
November 2007 action, has expired. An emergency exemption would 
nonetheless allow future removal action to occur. The emergency 
exemption is authorized when “[t]here is an immediate risk to public 
health or welfare of the United States or the environment; continued 
response actions are immediately required to prevent, limit, or mitigate 
an emergency; and such assistance will not otherwise be provided on a 
timely basis.”169 This exemption was applied to EPA’s removal activities 
in Libby, Montana. Although Swift Creek does not involve the dramatic 
public health risk present in Libby, it does present a large-scale, long-
term asbestos problem in a populated area, “not a remote, abandoned 
                                                
165. JAMES PETERSEN, ECOLOGY& ENV’T, INC., SWIFT CREEK ASBESTOS SITE TIME-CRITICAL 
REMOVAL ACTION REPORT, EVERSON, WASHINGTON 2-3, 3-2 (2008), available at http://yosemite.e
pa.gov/r10/CLEANUP.NSF/sites/sumasmtndocs/$FILE/Swift+CK+Removal+Rpt+Final_Apr2008.p
df. 
166. Interview by Douglas Naftz with Luke Loeffler, supra note 159. 
167. 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(3). 
168. Id. § 307.22(e)(2) (2011). 
169. Id. § 300.415(b)(5)(i). 
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mine”170 as the Ninth Circuit emphasized when it upheld EPA’s 
activities in Libby. Furthermore, as in Libby, “assistance from other 
government agencies [is] not anticipated on a timely basis.”171 
 The Ninth Circuit has noted that “[t]he term ‘emergency’ is not 
defined in CERCLA or the National Contingency Plan, and EPA has 
interpreted it to include a range of time-sensitive threats.”172 Although 
the term “emergency” has never been used by EPA with regard to the 
situation at Swift Creek, the request for the 2007 removal action at Swift 
Creek stated that “[a]ctual or threatened releases of hazardous substances 
from this site, if not addressed by implementing the response action 
selected in this action memorandum, may present an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to public health, or welfare or the 
environment.”173 This description is consistent with an emergency. 
 The selection of a time-critical removal action by EPA in 2007 may 
support the determination of an emergency at Swift Creek when flooding 
occurs. With a projected 400 to 600 years of sediment release from the 
Sumas Mountain landslide,174 Swift Creek likely will continue to deposit 
hazardous asbestos-containing sediment downstream into the foreseeable 
future. Now that dredging no longer occurs regularly, sediments 
accumulate in the streambed, increasing the risk of floods. Increased 
flood risk can only add to the time-sensitivity requirement of a future 
removal action; EPA’s 2009 testing established that flooding spreads the 
hazardous sediment over a large area and effectively multiplies the 
existing asbestos exposure pathways.175 
 Removal actions have been described as “time-sensitive responses 
to public health threats for which EPA is granted considerable leeway in 
structuring the cleanup.”176 The Ninth Circuit found that EPA's cleanup 
in Libby, which took place over the course of years, “was a removal 
action that was exempt from the temporal and monetary cap.”177 This 
                                                
170. United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005). 
171. Id. at 1231. 
172. Id. at 1248 n.25. 
173. JEFFRY RODIN, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FIRST ACTION MEMORANDUM: REQUEST 
FOR APPROVAL OF A TIME-CRITICAL REMOVAL ACTION AT THE SWIFT CREEK ASBESTOS SITE, 
EVERSON, WHATCOM COUNTY, WASHINGTON 7 (2007). 
174. 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 2-2. 
175. EPA supported its decision to conduct a removal action in Libby on the grounds that “the 
asbestos . . . posed an immediate threat to the local population; a cleanup beyond the cap was re-
quired to prevent, limit, or mitigate an emergency because of the size of the cleanup and the short 
construction season; and assistance from other government agencies was not anticipated on a timely 
basis.” W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d at 1231. Although the public health effects are nowhere near as 
immediate or egregious in the Swift Creek area as in Libby, the rationales regarding the size of the 
cleanup and the absence of assistance from other government agencies apply to Swift Creek. 
176. Id. at 1228. 
177. Id. at 1227. 
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type of long-term removal action is justified at Swift Creek because the 
previous dredge-and-deposit strategy of sediment management is no 
longer viable or even necessarily legal, to the extent dredged creek 
sediments would constitute a hazardous substance under CERCLA. 
Furthermore, consultants to EPA have estimated that the annual removal 
and transport of 100,000 cubic yards of Swift Creek sediment to a 
repository within ten miles of the creek (if such a place existed) would 
cost between $1.5 and $1.9 million per year over a period of five 
years.178 The odds that any public agency will be able to commit this 
level of funding to the Swift Creek problem, year after year, decade after 
decade, are very long. 
 A continuation of status quo approaches at the site clearly would 
cost too much and would not address asbestos exposure pathways 
originating from the creek sediment. Further, it would not stop the 
physical movement of sediment from the landslide into the creek. 
Therefore, the situation at Swift Creek warrants a long-term, multi-stage 
removal action. 
2. State Hazardous Substances Regulation 
 State law also has a role to play in addressing the Swift Creek 
problem. Washington State’s Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA)179 was 
“heavily patterned” after CERCLA.180 All hazardous substances listed in 
CERCLA are also listed as hazardous substances under the MTCA.181 
The MTCA seeks to “raise sufficient funds to clean up all hazardous 
waste sites and to prevent the creation of future hazards due to improper 
disposal of toxic wastes into the state's land and waters.”182 To this end, 
the MTCA holds parties accountable for “irresponsible use and disposal 
of hazardous substances”183 and requires the identification, investigation, 
and cleanup of contaminated properties that are, or may be, a threat to 
human health or the environment.184 
 MTCA resembles CERCLA in that “potentially liable [parties]” can 
be ordered to “provide the remedial action” for release of a hazardous 
substance.185 Additionally, the MTCA applies joint and several liability 
                                                
178. 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 3-8. 
179. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105 (2011). 
180. Taliesen Corp. v. Razore Land Co., 144 P.3d 1185, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); Pacifi-
corp Envtl. Remediation Co. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 259 P.3d 1115, 1128 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2011). 
181. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-200 (2003). 
182. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.010(2). 
183. Id. 
184. Id. § 70.105D.030. 
185. Id. § 70.105D.050(1). 
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to “remedial action costs and . . . natural resource damages resulting 
from the releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances.”186 Past 
and present owners and operators of facilities, arrangers, transporters, 
and sellers can all be held liable under the MTCA.187 
 For agencies and parties that have moved NOA-containing 
materials, liability issues under the MTCA are potentially as threatening 
as CERCLA liability. State courts have upheld a broader interpretation 
of MTCA arranger liability, for example, concluding that intent to 
dispose of a hazardous substance is not required.188 
 While the MTCA imposes the specter of liability, it also provides 
the prospect of assistance with cleanup. It authorizes the state 
Department of Ecology to conduct remedial actions “to remedy releases 
or threatened releases of hazardous substances.”189 Ecology’s hazardous 
waste cleanup, prevention, and management activities are funded by both 
a hazardous substances tax imposed on substances including chemicals, 
fertilizers, and petroleum products, as well as recovered costs from 
remedial actions.190 Washington also uses these revenues to maintain a 
state toxics control account for the broad purpose of “[w]ater and 
environmental health protection and monitoring programs.”191 Funds 
from the pollution tax are also deposited into a local toxics control 
account, for distribution to local governments, with remedial actions 
designated as the highest priority.192 
 The Washington State Legislature must appropriate all toxics 
control account funds,193 and, as noted below, the legislature has directed 
some funding to Swift Creek to assist with short-term stabilization 
measures and the search for longer-term approach to the problem. The 
                                                
186. Id. § 70.105D.040(2). 
187. Id. § 70.105D.040(1)(a)"(e). 
188. Pacificorp Envtl. Remediation Co. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 259 P.3d 1115, 1132 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (“The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of CERCLA does not 
trump our state courts' interpretation of Washington's comparable Act.”) (citing Seattle City Light v. 
Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 989 P.2d 1164, 1170 (Wash. Ct. App.1999) and Modern Sewer Corp. 
v. Nelson Distrib., Inc.,109 P.3d 11, 13–14 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), review denied, 122 P.3d 186 
(Wash. 2005)). 
189. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.030(1)(b). 
190. WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, HOUSE BILL 1761: MODEL TOXICS CONTROL ACCOUNTS 
TEN-YEAR FINANCING PLAN 15 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/ 
0801044.pdf. State agencies that receive funds for hazardous waste cleanup, prevention, and man-
agement activities include the Department of Health, Department of Agriculture, Department of 
Natural Resources, Washington State Patrol, Washington State Department of Transportation, and 
the Puget Sound Partnership, as well as the Department of Ecology. Id. 
191. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.070(2)(viii). 
192. Id. § 70.105D.070(3)(a). 
193. Id. § 70.105D.070(4). 
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legislature has neither appropriated funds for remedial action under the 
MTCA nor provided funding from the hazardous substance tax. 
B. The Army Corps of Engineers and Ecosystem Restoration 
 The possibility of a Corps ecosystem restoration194 project has been 
discussed as a way to address the Swift Creek problem. Ecosystem 
restoration projects “utilize engineering and other technical solutions to 
water and related land resources problems, with emphasis on improving 
degraded ecosystem function and structure.”195 The Corps focuses on 
“restoration opportunities that are associated with wetlands, riparian[,] 
and other floodplain and aquatic systems.”196 Ecosystem restoration 
projects are intended to address “ecological resources, and not . . . [the 
cleanup] of hazardous and toxic wastes . . . .” Under the Corps’ policies, 
cleanup presumably would be one of the “components of ecosystem 
restoration problems or opportunities [that] are better addressed by other 
agencies through their missions and programs.”197 Projects that “consist 
primarily of land acquisition are not appropriate as Civil Works 
ecosystem restoration investments.”198 
 At the 2007 public meeting, the Corps’ Seattle Division 
commander, Mike McCormick, discussed the possibility of ecosystem 
restoration, including the uncertainties that surround the Corps’ 
jurisdiction:199 
                                                
194. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, WATER RESOURCES POLICIES AND AUTHORITIES: 
CIVIL WORKS ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION POLICY 2 (Sept. 30, 1999), available at http://140.194.76.
129/publications/eng-regs/er1165-2-501/entire.pdf. (“Ecosystem Restoration is one of the primary 
missions of the Civil Works program. The purpose of Civil Works ecosystem restoration activities is 
to restore significant ecosystem function, structure, and dynamic processes that have been degraded. 
Ecosystem restoration efforts involve a comprehensive examination of the problems contributing to 
the system degradation, and the development of alternative means for their solution. The intent of 
restoration is to partially or fully reestablish the attributes of a naturalistic, functioning, and self-
regulating system.”). 
195. Id. at 3. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. The Corps derives its authority to engage in ecosystem restoration projects from a number 
of sources: 
a. Study authorities through which the Corps can examine ecosystem restoration 
needs and opportunities include: 1) congressionally authorized studies pursued under 
General Investigations (i.e., new start reconnaissance and feasibility studies for single-
purpose ecosystem restoration or multiple purpose projects which include ecosystem res-
toration as a purpose); 2) General Reevaluation Reports and reformulation opportunities 
in conjunction with significant Post-Authorization Change Reports; 3) Section 216, Re-
view of Completed Projects (River and Harbor and Flood Control Act of 1970); 4) major 
rehabilitation of existing projects; and 5) Section 22, Planning Assistance to States (Wa-
ter Resources Development Act (WRDA) 1974, as amended). 
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I have authority to do the ecosystem restoration. Is this an 
ecosystem restoration project? Don't know. One of the requirements 
of course is that I have a local sponsor in addition to having a 
federal. I'm the federal sponsor, but I need to have a local sponsor 
whether that's the state, DNR, or whether that's a local agency, the 
county. It requires that. If there is—that's an authority. I don't know 
if this qualifies for ecosystem restoration, but even if it did I'd still 
need a local sponsor.200 
 The requirements for local sponsors vary, depending on the source 
of authority for the ecosystem restoration project. Local sponsors must 
provide from twenty-five to forty percent of the project cost, depending 
on the circumstances; the extent to which in-kind contributions can be 
used to meet the local share varies.201 The process is competitive, as 
Commander McCormick described: 
How we get a local sponsor is we get a letter from a local sponsor 
saying they're willing to contribute a certain percentage depending 
on the type of study that we're going after or what portion of the 
process we're in. And it differs, but essentially somewhere around 
35, 40 percent is provided by the local sponsor and then the federal 
government, then we go in and we certainly talk to the 
congressional delegation and then the congressional delegation 
funds us for the federal portion, the federal share, and it is across 
the entire country where this 4.8 billion dollars worth of civil works 
appropriation money gets chopped up into various programs. And if 
this thing makes the cut, there is a federal chunk of money put into 
it. If the member of the Senate or a member of the House has 
enough pull to actually get the federal money applied, that takes 
care of the federal portion, but the local portion has to be provided 
by something that's not federal. . . . Someone has to write a letter 
saying we're willing to contribute 30, 40 percent of whatever this 
                                                                                                         
 b. Authorities through which the Corps can participate in the study, design, and im-
plementation of ecosystem restoration and protection projects include: 1) Section 1135, 
Project Modifications for Improvement of the Environment (Water Resources Develop-
ment Act (WRDA) of 1986, as amended); 2) Section 206, Aquatic Ecosystem Restora-
tion (WRDA 1996 ); 3) Section 204 Beneficial Uses of Dredged Material (WRDA 1992, 
as amended); and, 4) dredging of contaminated sediments under Section 312 of WRDA 
1990, as amended. 
 c. Additional opportunities for ecosystem restoration and protection may also be 
pursued through existing project authorities for the management of operating projects; 
e.g., through water control changes or as part of natural resources management. 
Id. at 2. 
200. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 36. 
201. The Corps’ ecosystem restoration policy spells out these obligations, which depend on 
whether the project is congressionally authorized or if it falls under various provisions of the Water 
Resources Development Act of 1986. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 194, at 4. 
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study and then later on at the end of the day, at the end of the study 
if there is an answer to the problem, then it gets authorized. At the 
end there's a chief's report by the chief of engineers, he signs off on, 
it gets authorized by congress, and then appropriations get applied 
for construction.202 
 Ecosystem restoration efforts are grounded in a benefit-cost 
analysis “involv[ing] a comprehensive examination of the problems 
contributing to the system degradation, and the development of 
alternative means for their solution.”203 This assessment considers 
monetary and non-monetary benefits, and follows “[t]he general 
guidance in the Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines 
for Water and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies 
(P&G).”204 The P&G is “intended to ensure proper and consistent 
planning by Federal agencies in the formulation and evaluation of water 
and related land resources implementation studies.”205 Under those 
guidelines, the Corps must analyze “all reasonable alternatives,” 
including “[a] plan that reasonably maximizes net national economic 
development benefits.”206 
 National economic development (NED) is defined as “the net value 
of the national output of goods and services, expressed in monetary 
units.”207 The importance of NED in this assessment emphasizes the 
benefit-cost nature of the Corps’ ecosystem restoration process. 
Although the P&G provide that the assessment should include “[o]ther 
plans which reduce net NED benefits in order to further address other 
Federal, State, local, and international concerns,”208 and the Corps’ 
ecosystem restoration policy guidance states that “measures do not need 
to exhibit net national economic development . . . benefits and should be 
viewed on the basis of non-monetary outputs compatible with the P&G 
selection criteria,”209 competition for limited resources is stiff, and the 
benefit-cost calculus is a significant factor. In general, the benefit-cost 
analysis process is problematic because “knowledge of the costs, 
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203. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 194, at 2. 
204. Id. at 5. 
205. U.S. WATER RES. COUNCIL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND 
GUIDELINES FOR WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES, at iv (Mar. 
10, 1983), available at ftp://ftp-fc.sc.egov.usda.gov/Economics/priceindexes/Data/PrinciplesAndGui
delinesLocalSite.pdf (indicating that the P&G applies to Corps (Civil Works), Bureau of Reclama-
tion, Tennessee Valley Authority, and Soil Conservation Service water resources project plans). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 194, at 5. 
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benefits, impacts, and interactions is rarely precise.” 210 These problems 
are magnified in the case of Swift Creek, where costs are extremely high 
and benefits are extremely difficult to quantify in the light of the 
uncertainties surrounding exposure to NOA and its health effects. 
 Representatives of Washington’s congressional delegation are not 
optimistic that the Corps will identify any viable alternatives that meet 
its benefit-cost standards.211 If it were calculated that several human lives 
would be saved from asbestos-related deaths through an ecosystem 
restoration project, a “savings” that might be calculated at around $7 
million per death,212 and that property damage from flooding would be 
averted, it is nevertheless unlikely that these “benefits” would outweigh 
the project costs for mitigation, which have been roughly estimated at 
more than $100 million.213 Under this calculus, it is difficult to see how 
assisting a sparsely-populated area would make the cost-benefit cut. 
 The availability of the required local contributions presents an 
equally significant barrier. Between 1998 and 2007, Whatcom County 
spent approximately $1.4 million on Swift Creek management activities, 
averaging approximately $140,000 per year.214 In 2009, the Washington 
State Legislature allocated $1 million for the cleanup of Swift Creek.215 
The required contribution of between twenty-five and forty percent of 
the restoration costs, if applied to the ballpark figure of $100 million 
contemplates a required local expenditure of $25 to $40 million. 
Compared to the few million dollars currently spent locally, this level of 
expenditure would represent an enormous escalation of funding for the 
Swift Creek asbestos problem. 
                                                
210. IGOR LINKOV ET AL., COMPARATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION 
MAKING 15 (2004). 
211. Interview by Douglas Naftz with Luke Loeffler, supra note 159. 
212. David Fahrenthold, Cosmic Markdown: EPA Says Life Is Worth Less, WASH. POST, July 
19, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/18/AR2008071803235.h
tml (emphasizing that according to new EPA estimates, the value of a ‘statistical human life’ is 
$7.22 million). 
213. This figure comes from a newspaper quote from an interview with a Whatcom County 
geologist. No agency calculations of the cost of mitigation appear to be publicly available. See Sam 
Taylor, State May Help Dredge Swift Creek, BELLINGHAM WASH. HERALD, Mar. 26, 2008,  
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214. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 3-8. 
215. WHATCOM CNTY. COUNCIL, AGREEMENT NO. 201003023, INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT 
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C. County and City Authority 
 At the local level, Whatcom County and the small cities affected by 
Swift Creek and the Sumas River have land use planning and zoning 
authority that could minimize human exposure to NOA by reducing 
population densities in the vicinity of the NOA. Perhaps reflecting their 
constituents’ skepticism about the degree of harm posed by asbestos-
laden soils, however, local governments appear reluctant to restrict land 
uses in areas affected by NOA. For example, only months after EPA 
found high levels of asbestos in floodplain sediments, the county council 
designated land in the Sumas River floodplain for urban-density 
growth.216 This decision was not made inadvertently; the local 
governments received testimony regarding the presence of asbestos-
laden soils in this area and requests that the affected area be omitted 
from the urban growth boundaries.217 This decision demonstrates both 
the difficulty of coordinating the activities of different levels of 
government and the problems that local government officials face in 
weighing property rights against long-term risk. 
 Washington State law also requires local governments, including 
Whatcom County, to designate geologically hazardous areas using the 
“best available science.”218 Regulations define “geologically hazardous 
areas” as “areas susceptible to erosion, sliding, earthquake, or other 
geological events. They pose a threat to the health and safety of citizens 
when incompatible commercial, residential, or industrial development is 
sited in areas of significant hazard.”219 The regulations further state that, 
“[w]hen technology cannot reduce risks to acceptable levels, building in 
geologically hazardous areas is best avoided.”220 
 Whatcom County’s current Comprehensive Plan only designates 
the Swift Creek alluvial fan, an area of approximately 495 acres,221 as a 
                                                
216. WHATCOM CNTY. COUNCIL, WHATCOM COUNTY COUNCIL ACTION TAKEN (Nov. 24, 
2009), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/council/meetings/council/actiontaken/pastactionta
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geologically hazardous area.222 Based on EPA’s sampling results from 
the 2009 flood, which showed highly elevated levels of asbestos in 
sediments along the Sumas River, the best available science seems to 
indicate that the geologically hazardous area designation should be 
extended to include other affected areas.223 Concerns about property 
values would make such a designation politically unpopular, however, 
and Whatcom County has not indicated any interest in using 
comprehensive planning to address the problem. 
V. THE RANGE OF SOLUTIONS 
[Q]uick and efficient cleanup of hazardous material eliminates risks to 
people and the environment and minimizes the stigma contamination can 
bring to properties and communities. 
—EPA, The Emergency Response and Removal Pro-
gram.224 
And with it being such a health risk, you would think that that would 
play into it because this is a national health risk is what I’m hearing 
today. So why are our hands tied and the money tied up? I don’t 
understand that. If it’s such a health concern, why isn’t there the money 
for this county not to be this big of a risk? And if you can’t answer that, 
it’s like where do we go next? What are we going to do? 
—Tammy Rawls, Resident, Whatcom County.225 
I’m here for a solution. I’m not here to find out how bad this stuff is or 
how good this stuff is or what we can or can’t do with this. I want a 
solution instead of all these things. It’s redundant to bring them up again, 
but we can’t get one agency here to come up with a solution. Nobody 
has. 
—Edward Bosscher, Resident, Whatcom County.226 
                                                
222. WHATCOM CNTY. COUNCIL, WHATCOM COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, at Map 27 
(June 2008), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/planning/comp_plan/pdf/20110101-
chapter-11.pdf (showing the Swift Creek alluvial fan designated as an “Alluvial Fan Hazard Area”). 
223. Id. at 11-11. This would be consistent with Whatcom County Comprehensive Plan Goal 
11-D: 
Minimize potential loss of life, damage to property, the expenditure of public funds and 
degradation of natural systems resulting from development in hazardous areas such as 
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conservation easements, growth planning, and other options to discourage development 
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224. United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1248 (9th Cir. 2005). 
225. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 54. 
226. Id. at 34–35. 
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 From the perspective of many residents affected by Swift Creek 
asbestos, government agencies arrived on the scene, proclaimed that 
NOA is a health hazard, and then moved on without solving the problem. 
From the perspective of agency officials, the scope and nature of the 
Swift Creek problem demands a response, but the lack of clear legal 
authority and the paucity of available resources stymie efforts to address 
the long-term needs of the region. Furthermore, as discussed, no single 
agency has the authority to tackle every aspect of the Swift Creek 
problem. As one Whatcom County representative stated, “it’s like a 
Hydra, the heads are moving.”227 
 Under these circumstances, federal, state and local approaches to 
the problem will have to be coordinated in order to approach the asbestos 
problem from a number of angles and to extend the reach of scarce 
resources. In a 2009 press release, EPA recognized the need for 
simultaneous application of a variety of solutions. Noting that 
“[e]ngineering options—including building a structure that would 
control sediment near the landslide—are being considered,” the agency 
explained that “[t]he situation may also call for changes to local land use 
planning.”228 
 The most popular approach probably is the engineered solution, 
which would be intended to prevent asbestos-laden soils from entering 
Swift Creek or from being distributed through flooding. Residents 
naturally hope that the problem can be controlled at its source in a way 
that does not depreciate property values or require the residents to 
change their lifestyles. One engineering alternative involves the 
construction of a large debris stabilization basin in the alluvial fan of 
Swift Creek. In 1971, the Corps selected this approach as the most 
feasible of three potential alternatives; but the concept failed to survive 
the requisite cost-benefit analysis.229 Subsequent studies have continued 
to propose ways to contain sediment, either as a long-term or short-term 
approach to the problem. 
 To date, the most thorough geotechnical study of the Swift Creek 
region remains the 1976 Soil Conservation Service study. The purpose of 
this study was to “make a preliminary evaluation of the feasibility of 
retarding the landslide movement via a landslide control structure or 
other means and for determining the size, type and location of a potential 
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sediment debris basin(s) located on the Swift Creek floodplain.”230 This 
report identified a range of alternative solutions.231 
 As outlined in the study’s purpose statement, two possibilities were 
evaluated in detail: a landslide control structure and sedimentation 
basins. The landslide control structure “would contain the debris at the 
source by means of an earth buttress constructed at the face of the 
landslide above the Swift Creek ‘narrows.’ ”232 This buttress would be 
1075 feet in length and would require excavating fourteen million cubic 
yards of landslide material and the re-use of thirteen million cubic yards 
as fill.233 Even in 1976, without accounting for the costs of worker 
protection while excavating asbestos-laden sediments or the costs of the 
disposal of the sediments, this engineering alternative was recognized to 
be too expensive to pursue any further.234 
 In light of the high costs of constructing a landslide control 
structure, sedimentation basins emerged as the favored engineering 
approach. Sediment basins are constructed to “reduce the volume of 
sediment transported, reduce the incidence of overbank flooding and the 
related flood plain sediment deposition.”235 Potential sites for two basins 
were identified.236 Excavated on-site soils from the sedimentation basins 
were proposed as the source of materials to build embankments and 
dikes. These materials consist of alluvial fan and flood channel 
deposits,237 now known to contain asbestos. 
                                                
230. CONVERSE DAVIS DIXON ASSOCS., INC., FINAL GEOTECHNICAL REPORT: SWIFT CREEK 
TRIBUTARIES, SUMAS RIVER WATERSHED, WHATCOM COUNTY, WASHINGTON PT. II, at 2 (Jan. 15, 
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233. Id. at 28. 
234. Id. at 29. 
235. Id. at 31. 
236. Id. at 32. 
237. Id. at 35. The report predicted embankments of thirty-five and twenty-five feet for Basin 
A and Basin B, respectively, would result in a trap efficiency of from seventy-five to ninety percent. 
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 The report estimated that the total project cost would be $3.6 
million, with annual operation and maintenance costs of $568,000.238 
Adjusting for inflation, the project cost today would be approximately 
$15 million, with an annual operating cost of $2.4 million.239 Of course, 
costs have changed over time. Even if some processes can be done more 
efficiently and some materials may be relatively cheaper, the fact that the 
1975 estimate did not include worker protection for handling hazardous 
asbestos-laden material is a countervailing factor. To help put these costs 
in perspective, EPA’s costs in 2007 for spraying dust suppressant, 
stockpile grading, and bank armoring were approximately $250,000.240 
Additionally, EPA estimated that the cost of removing 100,000 cubic 
yards of sediment per year for five years, and transporting it to a 
repository within ten miles—if such a place existed—would be between 
$1.5 and $1.9 million.241 
 The involved agencies have acknowledged that this type of large-
scale engineering solution is not economically feasible. In 2009, EPA, 
Ecology, and Whatcom County entered into a Joint Agency Agreement 
based on the premise that “[t]he agencies have concluded that engineered 
facilities to stop the erosion and deposition of Sumas Mountain 
sediments near their source are prohibitively costly and require resources 
far beyond those available to State and Local governments, and that 
Federal programs do not presently allow for spending of this 
magnitude.”242 The engineered solution currently under consideration is 
far more modest than the solution proposed in 1975. The Washington 
State Legislature allocated $1 million from the local toxics control 
account in 2009 “solely to clean up naturally occurring asbestos from 
Swift Creek.”243 Whatcom County and Ecology agreed to use the funds 
primarily for the management and improvement of the existing sediment 
piles on the side of Swift Creek, designated as “levees,” and for the 
design and construction of new levees and retention facilities. The 
parties also agreed to use the funds for floodplain easement, land 
acquisition, and geotechnical investigation of long-term solutions.244 
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 Whatcom County has since acquired property intended for the 
disposal of asbestos-containing sediment245—apparently skirting, or 
having received reassurances about, liability issues. It has also approved 
a sediment management plan for the construction of levees and 
excavated sediment basins with berms. Specifically, Whatcom County 
proposed the construction of two large basins on a seventy-acre site 
located in the existing Swift Creek alluvial fan. The basins would have a 
storage capacity of approximately two million cubic yards of 
sediment.246 Containment levees would be “offset from the banks of 
Swift Creek channel,” in order to contain larger debris flows and 
sediment from flooding events.247 
 The estimated cost for basin design, permitting, and construction is 
$4.6 million, with $2.5 million estimated for levee design and 
construction. The repair and maintenance costs are estimated at $250,000 
per year.248 While these costs greatly exceed any funding that has been 
dedicated to, or identified for, Swift Creek to date, it should further be 
noted that these engineering features are not viewed as permanent 
solutions. Landslide stabilization, optimistically priced at $150,000 to $4 
million, is identified as a long-term goal.249 
 Based on the current situation, it appears that the agencies are not 
anticipating that a Corps-sponsored ecosystem restoration will rescue 
Swift Creek. The Corps would be the logical lead agency for an 
engineered solution. Not only is the Corps experienced in large-scale 
engineering projects, but its ecosystem restoration authority is focused 
on water systems. In contrast to EPA, which has CERCLA authority 
more clearly authorized to address NOA handled by humans, the Corps’ 
ecosystem restoration authority is intended to avoid hazardous waste 
issues and to work to improve natural systems. An engineering approach 
led by the Corps could address the source of the Swift Creek asbestos 
problem. Realistically, however, both the feasibility and the cost make a 
large-scale engineering solution unlikely. 
 Reflecting the dearth of solutions, EPA tends to emphasize small-
scale, local policies. On its Swift Creek website, EPA notes: 
[I]n El Dorado County, California, for example, local land-use 
permits require geologic study and documentation of construction 
and waste management practices. In Fairfax County, Virginia, a 
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plan must be approved before construction occurs. In the future, 
local or state level changes, similar to this, will likely be needed in 
areas affected by asbestos carried downstream from Sumas 
Mountain landslide.250 
 In conjunction with the local governments’ planning and zoning 
authority, these local controls might help to reduce risk. El Dorado and 
Fairfax County are unlike the Swift Creek area, however, because the 
asbestos in those locations is in the ground and the rocks. It is not 
transported, by a river delivery system, and there is no landslide 
providing a continuous source of asbestos-laden sediments. 
 Rather than trying to stop the asbestos from moving, or engaging in 
low-level mitigation measures that may or may not reduce risk and harm, 
the agencies need to determine whether the Swift Creek geologically 
hazardous area is simply incompatible with human settlement. Given the 
unique temporal and geographic scope of NOA distribution in the Swift 
Creek area, the most protective and inexpensive option might be simply 
to purchase affected properties. 
 A land-purchase solution would likely put EPA in the lead, based 
on its response authority under CERCLA. This would be an innovative 
approach. Although permanent relocation of residents at a CERCLA 
cleanup site is not unprecedented, such relocation has not occurred 
during a removal action at a site that is neither listed nor pending listing 
on the NPL. Based on the broad statutory deference offered to EPA 
through the inclusive language of CERCLA, however, permanent 
relocation is certainly not outside the realm of policy options at EPA’s 
disposal when carrying out a complex removal action.251 
 The definition of a remedial action under CERCLA provides insight 
into the types of situations that might warrant relocation: 
[T]he costs of permanent relocation of residents and businesses and 
community facilities where the President determines that, alone or 
in combination with other measures, such relocation is more cost-
effective than and environmentally preferable to the transportation, 
storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of 
                                                
250. Frequently Asked Questions about Sumas Mountain Asbestos, Swift Creek and 
Sumas River, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 26, 2009), http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/cleanup.nsf/
sites/sumasmtnfaq. 
251. The lists of example removal actions outlined under CERCLA in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), 
and in the NCP under 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(e) are not exhaustive, and act as a “general rule” for what 
removal actions might include. Given the broad statutory deference offered to EPA, it is likely that 
even property acquisition, which normally occurs in remedial actions, could be utilized under a 
complex removal action. 
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hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the 
public health or welfare . . . .252 
 Using this definition as a guide, a rough estimate can be prepared of 
the cost of relocating property owners affected by Swift Creek NOA. 
The assessed value of all properties within a quarter-mile buffer zone 
around the creek can be calculated by using data from Whatcom County 
and Geographic Information Systems software. Based on total assessed 
property values from 2007,253 the seventy-one properties within a 
quarter-mile buffer zone of Swift Creek are worth approximately 
$7,673,790. In contrast, the cost of dredging, transportation, and disposal 
of hazardous sediment from Swift Creek over a period of 400 years or 
more can be roughly estimated at two million dollars per year.254 
Permanent relocation of homeowners near Swift Creek is therefore a 
viable policy alternative. A dredge-and-deposit strategy of sediment 
management exceeds permanent relocation costs after only four years. 
Thus, as a means of eliminating asbestos exposure pathways over a long 
period of time, permanent relocation would be the most cost-effective 
method. 
 Additionally, permanent relocation addresses another important 
exposure pathway—indoor exposure to asbestos from Swift Creek.255 
Although EPA has identified indoor air exposure as a risk factor, indoor 
exposure has not been quantified or incorporated into EPA’s risk 
calculations. It is possible that harmful asbestos-containing sediment 
from Swift Creek has accumulated in homes, where residents inhale it 
for longer durations than would occur during outdoor exposure. Indoor 
exposure may also result from the local transport and use of Swift Creek 
sediments as fill material. Thus, as indicated by EPA and the 
Washington Department of Health, it is possible that NOA exists in 
driveways and other residential areas near sites where the fill was 
                                                
252. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (2010). 
253. Total assessed value includes value of built structures, land, and any resource value that 
may exist on the site. 
254. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 3-8. This cost estimation incorporated several im-
portant assumptions, including the ability to remove and export 20,000 cubic yards of hazardous 
dredged sediment per year to a disposal site within ten miles. Under these conditions, it was estimat-
ed that over a five-year period, 100,000 cubic yards of hazardous sediment (the estimated volume of 
stockpiled sediment currently residing at the site) could be removed and disposed off site for be-
tween $1.5 and $1.9 million per year, with transportation costs accounting for between twenty and 
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255. According to the Washington Department of Health, “[r]isk estimates may in fact be un-
derestimated because exposures may occur at other locations such as indoor environments of resi-
dences near Swift Creek.” PUBLIC HEALTH EVALUATION, supra note 121, at 13. Additionally, prop-
erties downstream (including those on the Sumas River) are “areas where questions remain about 
non-occupational exposure.” Id. at 11. 
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used.256 Compared to the dredge-and-deposit solution, which only 
mitigates exposure within the immediate vicinity of the creek, permanent 
relocation could eliminate exposure within homes as well as exposure 
from sediments in and surrounding the creek. 
 Property owners may resist permanent relocation. On the other 
hand, they may recognize that relocation provides proactive mitigation of 
decreasing property values caused by the presence and stigma of NOA. 
Washington law requires the disclosure of asbestos in or on a residential 
property when it is sold.257 The free market may well provide a more 
draconian solution than the proposed purchase of properties affected by 
NOA. The depreciation process has been aptly described as follows: 
One issue that may come and be disclosed by the seller is the 
presence of or concerns about environmental contamination on the 
property. Once this topic is introduced, the buyer-seller 
conversation is altered away from positive attributes of the property 
to a potentially deal-killing topic while the potential buyer assesses 
their taste for environmental risk. In many cases, the potential buyer 
will walk away from a contaminated property, especially if the 
property is not uniquely excellent and if there are some 
uncontaminated substitutes for it. Hence, this substitution effect acts 
to depress demand for the property, driving down the sales price.258 
 Free market proponents might argue that the market should control 
the price of properties affected by NOA. After all, properties with 
quicksand or fault lines are worth less than other properties, and NOA is 
equally a result of natural forces. Looking at the situation from the 
property owners’ perspective, however, the situation is more equivalent 
to an innocent landowner affected by a Superfund site. Landowners 
affected by Swift Creek NOA did nothing wrong, and they are exposed 
to health risks that the government has determined to be unacceptable. 
 Superfund law, however, revolves around the liability of a 
responsible party. As a result, it not only fails to provide a clear path 
forward in many situations involving NOA, but it can actually chill 
agency action, with the unintended consequence of exposing citizens to 
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greater risks.259 Nonetheless, if agencies are willing to interpret it 
aggressively to protect public health, existing law can lead to a solution 
for exposure to naturally occurring asbestos. The unspoken issue is 
whether our society will view this problem as a communal issue, 
requiring an investment of societal resources, or if individuals will be left 
to bear the brunt of the problem. 
 As a slow-moving emergency that confronts a relatively small and 
conflicted constituency, the pressure for leadership on NOA is muted. 
Thus, the problem is likely to sort itself out through market-choice 
mechanisms. Property values will provide a rough reflection of the risk 
of asbestos exposure. Those who cannot afford to live anywhere else, or 
who discount the risk, will remain in areas with NOA. 
 If Swift Creek is a guide, citizens will have great difficulty making 
individual risk assessments in the face of the complexity of the health 
effects of asbestos, with its long latency period and uncertainties about 
exposure. No matter their generalized view of the role of government, 
affected residents will tend to assume that the government will protect 
their health from identified hazards. As an anonymous commentator 
wrote on the local newspaper’s web site: 
Well, well, well . . . Until you have it all over YOUR property, your 
driveways/roads after flooding, and all over the inside of your 
home, . . . you have no idea how much it impacts your life, your 
property value, your future and your ability to sell your property 
when you are no longer able to run a farm and no one will buy it 
because it is contaminated with the stuff . . . . 
We would be more than happy to let the county buy our property at 
the “before” contamination value, and let nature take it's course. No 
people living here—no health concerns. I'd rather not be that guinea 
pig for you all. Thanks!260 
 Unfortunately for the anonymous commentator, the harsher calculus 
of cost-benefit analysis, rather than the assumed social contract of 
government protection, is likely to determine the outcome of the Swift 
Creek NOA problem. New laws specific to the context of NOA, as well 
as additional scientific understanding of asbestos would, of course, help 
to protect citizens in all areas affected by NOA. Further research 
regarding the health impacts of short asbestos fibers, as well as 
additional work on indoor and outdoor exposure to NOA, would help 
citizens and regulators to understand the risks of NOA. Federal or state 
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laws requiring NOA to be addressed as a geological hazard would 
provide local governments with a template, and would help local 
governments to implement rational land use controls that balance their 
constituents’ immediate concerns about property rights and property 
values. 
 If and when NOA rises to a level of priority that pushes the 
government to act, these are all actions that would help to eliminate the 
“seam between the authorities” in which the players in the Swift Creek 
drama find themselves. In the meantime, the real estate market will 
continue to apply its rough justice, while agencies, scientists, and 
residents continue to scramble to balance long-term concerns against 
short-term economic realities. These efforts, and the work of 
communities around the country, are the laboratories of experimentation 
that will lead to a more rational, less ad hoc approach to the difficult 
legal and health issues raised by naturally occurring asbestos. 
 
